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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US$1 = W 860 (as of April 1985)
US$1.16 = W 1000
US$1 million = W 860 million
US$1,162 = W I million
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 meter (m) = 3.2808 feet (ft)
1 kilometer (km) = 0.62.mile (mi)
I square kilometer (km2) = 0.3861 square miles (sq mi)
1 hectare (ha) = 0.01 km2 = 2.4711 acres (ac)
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds (lbs)
I metric ton Cm ton) = 2.204.6226 pounds (lbs)
1.1023 short tons (sh tons or 2,000 lbs)
0.9842 long tons (Ig ton or 2,240 lbs)
PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED
BPR - Bureau of Public Roads
CTC - Centralized Traffic Control
EPB - Economic Planning Board
GOK - Government of Korea
KEC - Korea Highway Corporation
KHPA - Korea Maritime and Ports Authority
KNR - Korean National Railroad
MOC - Ministry of Construction
HOER - Ministry of Energy and Resources
MOF - Ministry of Finance
MOHA - Ministry of Home Affairs
MOT - Ministry of Transportation
SMESRS - Seoul Metropolitan Electric Suburban Rail System
TCC - Transport Coordination Committee
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KOREA
SEOUL - BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Loan and Project Summary
Borrower: Republic of Korea
Amount: $67 million equivalent
Terms: Repayable in 15 years with 3 years of grace, at the
standard variable rate
Project
Description: The basic objective of the project is to assist the Korean
National RaiLways (KKR) to increase transport efficiency
and capacity of rail services in the Seoul-Busan
Corridor. The loan funds would help finance part of a
Kanagement Improvement Program to be implemented over the
1985-88 period. KNR's Program includes: (a) institutional
and policy measures aimed mainly at ensuring long-term
economic and fintncial viability of the railways by further
improving services that are mosc profitable; (b) measures
to improve intermodal complementarity and railway
competitiveness and to prepare the ground for a high speed
train, a major capacity increase to be introduced in the
90s; and (c) capacity expansion through resignalling and
central traffic control between Suweon-Daegu on the Seoul-
Busan Corridor, and related rolling-stock/equipment,
( providing over one-third more trains more safely and at
faster speed. The proposed project comprises the
resignalling and central craffic control components of item
(c), as well as associated technical assistance and
training. The project has a high economic return and the
signalling overhaul is overdue.
Risks: Risk for this type of project is in traffic forecasting;
but in Korea's rapidly growing economy actual passenger
traffic has typically exceeded forecasts in the past.
Sensitivity analysis shows that a satisfactory return wouLd
be achieved even with substantially lower traffic growth.
Project Cost: Local Foreign Total
- (USM million) -
Signalling 17.0 43.6 60.6
Power Supply 3.1 3.3 6.4
Comounications 8.9 9.5 18.4
Equipment Rooms 4.4 - 4.4
Supervision 3.8 - 3.8
Coaches 51.1 - 51.1
Materials, etc. 10.0 - 10.0
Base Cost 98.3 56.4 154.7
Physical contingencies 4.9 0.6 5.5
Price contingencies 8.1 10.0 18.1
Total Project Cost 111.3 67.0 178.3
Identifiable duties and taxes are about $23.4 million. Total project cost net
of duties and taxes is about $154.9 million.
Financing Plan: Local Foreign Total Z
(US$ million)
World Bank loan - 67.0 67.0 38
The Government 111.3 - 111.3 62
Total Financing 111.3 67.0 178.3 100
Estimated Bank FY 1986 1987 1988 1989
Disbursements:
Annual 2.8 20.3 14.9 29.0
Cumulative 2.8 23.1 38.0 67.0
Rate of Return: 41Z
Staff Appraisal Report: No. 5570-KO dated April 29, 1985
Naps: No. IBRD 13133R1 and 18758
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I. TRANSPORT SECTOR
A. Geographic and Economic Setting
1.01 The Republic of Korea has a land area of 98,500 sq km. About 70% of
the land area is mountainous and agriculture is confined to about 22,600 sq
km, or 23Z of the total area, mainly in the river valleys, lower hillsides and
coastal plains. The climate is seasonal with very cold dry winters and hot
humid summers. AnnuaL rainfall averages 800 mm to 1,400 mm with about 60%
falling between June and September. The land mass is drained by a well
developed river system with seasonal variations in flow which give rise to
frequent flooding. The rugged terrain, extensive river system and severe
winter cLimate make the construction of transport faciLities, particularly
roads, difficuLt and costly.
1.02 The population is presently estimated at about 40 million and is
growing at an annual rate of 1.7%. Population density is estimated at 388 per
sq km of total area or 1,702 per sq km of agricultural land. Urban population
is estimated to be growing at an annual rate of 4.6% and has increased from
40.7% of the total in 1970 to 55.9% in 1982. The increasing urban population
has created significant transport demand in the areas around the cities and
industrial centers and between them; particularly in the Seoul - Busan
(Cyeongbu) Corridor.
1.03 Korea's export-led industrialization has been among the most suc-
cessful examples of economic development in recent history. During 1962-78,
real GNP grew by 10 p.a. and per capita income more than tripled in real
terms. Coupled with industrialization and urbanization, major deveLopments
and changes in the transportation sector complemented and supported the trans-
formation of Korea's economy. Passenger traffic tripled between 1964 and 1971
and tripled again by 1982; freight increased nine times and five time3 respec-
tively during the same periods.
B. The Transport System
1.04 Throughout much of the past 20 years, the transport system has been
strained by the demands of rapid growth and it has required massive public
sector investments in transport infrastructure. The Government has been allo-
cating up to 23% of its total capital expenditure to expand and modernize
transport infrastructure from 1967 to 1977 tapering down to about 15Z in the
Fourth (1977-81) and Fifth PLans (1982-86). Investments have been concentra-
ted on the Seoul-Busan axis where most industrial development is taking place
and on other corridors serving the northeastern and southeastern parts of
Korea.
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1.05 Substantial changes in the modal distribution of traffic are
illustrated by traffic statistics for the 1961 to 1982 period (Tables 1.1 and
1.2). Freight traffic moving by rail, although showing growth in absolute
terms, fell from 88Z of total ton-km to 37Z, while the road and coastal ship-
ping shares increased from 8% to 36% and from 4% to 27%, respectively. For
passenger traffic, the rail sbare of total passenger-km fell from 53% to 22%
over the same period, while the road share increased from 451 to 75%. These
changes reflect both the economic advantages of the various modes and the dif-
ferent growth rates experienced between industries served, as rail and coastal
shipping increasingly were concentrated on long distances and bulk commodities
while road transport handled the short distances and more general cargo. In
addition, rapidly expanding personal consumption generated large increases in
personal travel. This travel is made mainly by public transport such as
express trains and buses, since high taxation of private cars and gasoline has
limited motorization to a level significantly below that of other countries
with income Levels comparable to those of Korea.
1.06 The Government of Korea's (COK) basic objective in the past has been
to increase the capacity of the system in line with projected traffic growth
and to avoid major bottlenecks. This objective has been largely achieved.
The present system is reasonably balanced and there is little uneconomic allo-
cation of traffic among the various modes. Investments in transportation have
been linked to broader concerns in Korea's spatial and economic planning. For
example, considerable efforts have been made to develop new industrial com-
plexes in coastal areas, to take advantage of Korea's natural potential in
harbors and to exploit low-cost coastal shipping while avoiding excessive con-
gestion on road and rail. Similarly, in its efforts to ensure that appropri-
ate development priorities were reflected in the allocation of scarce trans-
portation means among the competing claims, the Government has maintained
fairly tight regulations in the sector, with a restrictive licensing system
and administered pricing for all transport activities. These tight regula-
tions which have not always enhanced efficiency in transport, are under
review.
1.07 Large investments in transportation infrastructure have been com-
plemented by a considerabLe effort to improve the efficiency of the transpor-
tation system, through the establishment and strengthening of institutions to
plan, construct, maintain and operate the facilities and services. In the
public sector, institutions such as the Korean National Railroad (KNR), the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) in the Ministry of Construction (MOC), the Korea
Highway Corporation (KHC), and the Korea Maritime and Port Administration
(KMPA) have been established or strengthened in many instances with increasing
financial and managerial responsibility as semi-autonomous public corpora-
tions. In the private sector, a highly efficient contractor system has
evolved for civil works which reflects both the insistence on competitive
bidding in the award of contracts as a matter of policy, and the large volume
of construction that has been carried out in Korea during the past 20 years.
There are now some 500 firms capable of handling a broad range of public
works. Furthermore, with Government encouragement, the major construction
firms have successfully expanded their construction activities overseas; in
1981, Korean contractors won overseas contracts valued at over US$13 billion,
though due to adverse international conditions, new orders dwindled to less
than half this total by 1984.
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1.08 Details on the last four Five-Year Investment Plans (1962-81)
together with the Bank's involvement in the transport sector are given in
Annex 1.
C. Transport Sector Objectives and Issues in the 1980s
1.09 Objectives. The Government's main goals for the transport sector as
stated in the Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (FFYP)
(1982-86) are to: (a) selectively increase transport capacity by modernizing
equipment and optimizing investments in the sector; (b) enhance transport
efficiency by improving intermodal trafEic allocation and conserving energy;
and (c) strengthen maintenance activities.
1.10 These FFYP goals are appropriate and timely. Recovery from the
recession of 1979/81 is now completed, with an economic growth rate over 9% in
1984 and inflation down to 3% p.a. Growth for the medium-term is likely to be
high, although more modest than during the 1970s. The recent economic slow-
down has provided a two-fold lesson for the transportation sector. On the one
hand, the timing of investments needed to sustain further improvements in
transport capacity and quality of service will have to be closely linked to
the growth of traffic for each mode. On the other hand, the capacity of the
public sector to finance the necessary upgrading and expansion of infrastruc-
ture and facilities in transportation will be constrained by foreign borrowing
limitations.
1.11 For the medium term, the Fifth Five Year Plan projects a GNP growth
rate of 7.6% p.a. over the period 1982-86, with a corresponding increase in
transport demand estimated at about 47 billion passenger-km and 10 billion
ton-km, respectively 50% and 30% above fourth pLan period outcomes (Tables 1.3
and 1.4). Investments in transportation (public and private) are expected to
increase by about 45% and remain at close to 14% of the total planned outlay
as in the fourth plan. They will amount to some US$16.3 billion, calculated
at 1980 prices and exchange rates. However, investments in subways and
aviation will absorb a larger fraction of the total as will road vehicles and
ships. Hence, real investment in the railway system, road and port infra-
structure would increase by less than 20% above fourth plan outlays
(Table 1.5).
1.12 Issues. A Bank transport sector mission reviewed the transport
investments proposed in the FFYP and identified the policy and institutional
issues impeding efficieacy in the sector. The mission concluded (in the
Transport Sector Issues Survey Report No. 4423-KO dated December 27, 1983)
that, although most of the transport investments proposed under the Plan
pursue development priorities which are appropriate, cansiderably more could
be done to increase the productivity of existing facili ies and equipment.
With the increasingly complex traffic patterns and higher traffic densities,
the growing requirements for maintenance of the expanded system, and the need
to conserve energy, the mission foresaw an even greater need to maximize
efficiency and use of limited investment outlays in this capital intensive
sector. The mission recommended focussing on planning, regulation and
pricing, and energy conservation as the three main areas requiring specific
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attention in the current more demanding economic environment. Details are
given in Annex 2. Noteworthy are measures introduced under the 1984 Highway
Sector Project (Loan 2392-KO) to improve (a) road investment planning;
(b) energy efficiency in transport; and (c) regulation and pricing in road
transport. Progress so far is satisfactory. The proposed project will help
in increasing utilization of existing rail capacity, improve efficiency and
stimulate inter-modal complementarity.
D. Bank's Role
1.13 It is expected that the Bank's policy dialogue would be strengthened
in future years through the increasing emphasis being given to a sector and
subsector approach in transport lending in Korea. The recently approved
Highway Sector Project will deepen and broaden our involvement in the road
subqector by extending assistance for the Ministries of Construction (0OC), of
Home Affairs (MOHA), of Transport (MOT) and of Energy and Resources (MOER).
This involvement provides the Bank with an opportunity to improve coordination
between those agencies and to strengthen the basis for another possible high-
way subsector loan. Similarly, a recently completed ports container site
Location study examined seve.*l alternatives where container faciLities could
be developed to handle the nation's traffic through the next decade and may
lead to a port subsector loan. For railways, the Bank has traditionally made
sector type loans, financing time slices of KNR's investment plans with the
sixth and seventh railway projects covering respectively 1978/79 and 1980/81
investments.
1.14 Besides these subsector operations, we are assisting the Government
in developing multimodal projects. The first was the Coal and Cement Distri-
bution Project (Loan 2267-KO) approved in 1983, involving railways, ports and
inland terminals. It will be followed by projects directed toward increasing
the capacity of the system in certain high priority areas and corridors rather
than expanding the system as a whole. The Bank is assisting in developing an
integrated modal study to meet the very high transport demand in the suburban
areas of Seoul (Kyeonggi multimodal transport study) where a dense network of
facilities are needed. The complementarity of the various modes will be pro-
moted by deveLoping interconnecting terminals to optimize the use of this
suburban transport network. Another multi-modal transport study carried out
from 1983 to 1985 concerns the Seoul-Busan transport corridor and the feasi-
bility of a high speed rail line between Seoul and Busan. The proposed
project represents a first step to increase capacity; subsequent steps might
include a high speed train, which would run on a separate, dedicated track,
and further road transport improvements. A third study to follow later is
being discussed with Government covering the southeast coastal region from
Suncheon to Pohang, where most heavy industries are concentrated, and new
developments are being considered at the Kwang-yang Bay.
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II. RAILWAY SUBSECTOR
A. KNR Organization and Management
2.01 The Korean National Railroad (KNR) was established on December 31,
1961 as a quasi-business enterprise owned by the Covernment of the Republic of
Korea and controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. The initiAl capital
comprised railroad assets, net of certain liabilities, transferreu at
estimated fair value at January 1, 1962. Actual title to real property vests
in the Government of the Republic of Korea. By statute, KNR bas the right of
use or disposition of property either originally transferred co it or later
acquired, and the right to receive rental or sale proceeds. Land may be
appropriated by the Government and dedicated to certain public uses without
compensation to KNR.
2.02 The Administrator of KNR is appointed by the Government to
assume the function of General Manager. The Administrator is assisted by a
Deputy-Administrator who comes from within KNR and is in charge of the day-to-
day operations. Chart 24503 shows KNR's organization. KNR's management
enjoys reasonable day-to-day managerial freedom.
2.03 It is pLanned that in 1987 KNR will be converted to a public
corporation. It would be empowered to incur debt, fix the emoluments of its
staff and control its own budget. Management consultants funded by the Bank
under the Fifth Railway Project (1101-KO) have advised on the steps necessary
to effect the transition and on the organizationaL changes to be adopted, and
an implementation program has been designed and is now in progress.
B. Staffing and Training
2.04 KNR presently employs about 40,000 staff of whom about 34,500 are
permanent employees with Government civil service status. *The rest comprise
semi-permanent and temporary personnel used in workshops and on track works on
a seasonal basis. Staff productivity in terms of traffic units per employee
has been rising in recent years and is now one of the highest in the world;
it reached 823,000 units per employee in 1983 as against some 500,000 typical
in European railways. This is due partly to the dense urban and intercity
passenger travel and heavy bulk mineral traffic and partly to KNR's staff
training, discipline and professionalism.
2.05 Training facilities comprise a Railroad School where courses are
offered to recviits at both high school and college levels, and a training
center with regional branches at which various types of training (including
management development) are provided to current staff. Previous Bank projects
have financed equipment and materials for practical training, and overseas
training in specialized subjects for seLected staff.
C. Accounting and Audit
2.06 KNR operates a double-entry accrual based accounting system. Its
Einancial statements are prepared according1lo generally accepted accounting
principles applicable in the United States.-
2.07 KNR's audit arrangements consist of a review (according to standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)
performed by an independent Korean public accounting firm acceptable to the
Bank. The reports, which under previous Loan agreements are to be received by
the Bank within six months of the financial yearend, have been tardy in the
past but are now timely.
D. Railway Facilities
2.08 The system consists of 3,100 route-km of standard gauge (1.435 m)
and 47 km of narrow gauge (0.76 m) lines; 760 km are double track and the
remainder singLe track (Map 13134). The major sections of double track line
are Gyeongbu (Seoul-Pusan, 491 km) and Chungbuk (Chochiveon - Bongyang, 110
km). 428 route-km are electrified.
2.09 Centralized traffic control (CTC) has been installed in the Seoul
urban area and on the heavily trafficked electrified single line Seoul-
Jecheon. Under the Seventh Project (Loan 1836-KO), CTC is being installed on
the section Yeongju-Gyeongju of the Jung Ang line (about 164 km deferred from
the sixth railway project) and the Tae Baeg line (about 107 km). The Gyeongbu
line, which is the subject of the proposed project, has an automatic block
system, while on other lines electric interlocking or token block systems are
used. For safety, an automatic train stopping system is being installed.
2.10 KNR's motive power fleet at the end of 1983 comprised 449 diesel and
90 electric locomotives and 113 diesel rail cars. 320 electric railcars
provide commuter services. The fleet is modern and in good condition. Roll-
ing stock comprises about 2,100 passenger cars, and about 16,000 freight cars.
2.11 KNR maintains a number of workshops, of which the main ones are at
Seoul (electric locomotives, diesel and electric railcars, passenger cars and
freight cars), Yeongdeungpo (steam locomotives, passenger cars and freight
cars), Incheon (passenger cars and freight cars), and Busan (diesel locomo-
tives, passenger cars and freight cars). Steam locomotives bave been com-
pletely phased out. A new rolling stock workshop has been constructed at
Daejeon; the freight car shop is just completed and the passenger car shop is
in use.
1/ With the major exception of the revaluation of assets, which is
incorporated in KNR's primary accounting records.
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E. Traffic
2.12 In 1984 KNR's intercity passenger services carried 165 million
passengers an average distance of 108 km, totaling 17.8 biLlion passenger-
km. In recent years, intercity traffic has declined from a peak reached in
1980. The total however conceals a shift of traffic from ordinary trains to
expresses, whose ridership increased from 40 million in 1979 to over 55
million in 1984, an annual rate of 7Z. The average journey distance also
increased. Suburban traffic on the Seoul area SMESRS has also been growing at
about 7% p.a. For the future, growth of express passenger and SMESRS is
projected to continue at 6% and 7% respectively (passenger-km terms), while
ordinary traffic will continue to decline. KNR passenger traffic statistics
are at Tables 2.1-2.3.
2.13 Freight traffic has grown at average annuaL rates of 6.7% in tons
and 6% in tons-km since 1966. Major commodities which contributed to these
increases were coaL and cement. Bulk commodities such as these and ore, oil,
fertilizer, and grain accounted for over 80% of KNR's total freight ton-km in
1984, up from 69% in 1966. Apart from some military and KNR's own transport,
the remainder consists mainly of general cargo. In 1984, freight traffic
totalled 53.7 million tons and the average freight haul was 230 km. KMB
freight statistics are at Table 2.4.
F. Investment Plan
2.14 KMI plans its investments on a five year cycle coterminuous with the
national five year plan; the present version covers the period 1982-1986.
According to this plan, W 545 billion will be spent during the period on
projects with a total value of W 1,120 billion which will be initiated during
the period or were already in progress at the beginning. Of this total,
approximately W 400 billion (36Z) relates to renewal or major maintenance of
track, equipment and structures. The principal new works are double tracking
of the Honan line (Iri-Songjongri, W 220 billion) and standardization of the
Suwon line (Suwon-Inchon, W 110 billion). The Government has agreed under
previous loans that substantial changes to the investment plan wiLl only be
made with the Bank's concurrence. Project selection procedures are well
developed, and EPB approval is required before new projects can be accepted
into the plan. The investment plan, and potential new candidate projects, are
reviewed by the Bank in the course of supevision of ongoing projects.
C. Tariffs
2.15 DNR's tariffs are uniform throughout the system and are regulated by
the Coveranient. Following major upward adjustments of both freight rates
(45Z) and passenger fares (40%) in 1980, regular annual adjustments have been
effected to ensure that rates fully reflect the effect of inflation.
According to data produced from KNR's traffic costing system, all major
services are operating at or above breakeven on a fully-distributed cost
basis, with the notable exception of ordinary passenger train services, which
are operated at a substantial loss in furtherance of government's social
policies. The effects of this on KNR are discussed more fully in the
Financial Analysis at para. 6.03.
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III. THE SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR
A. General Economic Situation
3.01 The Seoul-Busan (Cyeongbu) Corridor links the capital city of Seoul
to the large industrial areas of the Southeast coast and the port city of
Busan. In between, the cities of Daegu and Daejon are the third and fourth
largest urban areas of the country after Seoul and Busan. The corridor
contains about two-thirds of Korea's population and accounts for over 70% of
GNP. Further details of the economic importance of the corridor are in the
table below:
PRESENT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF GYEONGBU CORRIDOR (1982)
Cyeongbu corridor Gyeongbu corridor in
Korea service area Z of country totals
Area (km) 98,997 34,897 35.3
Population
(1,000 persons) 39,331 25,896 65.8
Population density(man/km) 397 741 186.7
Manufacturing outputs
(billion Won) 43,225 37,374 86.5
G.N.P.
(billion Won) 38,437 28,336 73.7
Productivity
(1,000 Won/I= 2 ) 388,266 811,979 209.1
Car ownership
(in Unit) 646,996 516,192 79.8
Rail passengers
(million passenger km) 15,838 8,871 56.0
Note: The figures of G.N.P, Productivity and outputs in manufacturing are
in constant 1980 prices.
Source: Review of Long-Term Transport Investment Needs in the Seoul-Busan
Corridor and Feasibility Study ef a High Speed Rail Line Between
Seoul and Busan; Interim Phase II Report for HOT; Berger, KRIHS,
Ksapsax, Hyundai, March 31, 1984.
3.02 The major objective of the Government's long-term national land use
plan is to seek a more balanced and decentralized development on the basis of
integrated regional settlement areas. However, two among the three primary
growth centers and two among the twelve secondary centers included in the plan
are in the Gyeongbu corridor. Even with implementation of the development
strategies, the share of population and GNP in the corridor is expected to
continue increasing over the next decade.
3.03 The transport network in the corridor displays an hourglass shape
with a dense network around Seoul in the North, a narrow neck through the
mountainous area between Daejon and Daegu in the center and a wider service
area between Daegu and Busan. The spine of the system consists of a double
track rail line and a four Lane expressway. From Daegu, the expressway splits
intO two branches going to Busan via Ulsan in the East and Kasan in the
South. Because of its geographical and topographical characteristics, the
corridor is well defined and suitable for high density public transport
services (Maps IBRD 13133R1 and 18758).
B. Traffic
3.04 Passenger traffic in the corridor nearly tripled in 11 years from
1971 to 1982. The construction of the expressway in the early 1970s intro-
duced competition for the railway and resulted in the fast development of
express bus services; the parallel national highway is used now mainly for
shorter trips. The railways responded by upgrading the quality of their
service and introducing air conditioned express trains. The table below illu-
strates the growth rates of various modes and also the shift from ordinary
trains to the higher quality express services for which traffic increased over
five times during the period.
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SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PASSENGER TRAFFIC 1971-82
(million pkm)
82/71
1971 Z 1982 Z ratio
Eligh Quality Services
Railroad 1,188 6 9,835 19 8.3
Express bus 3,205 17 12,441 24 3.9
Air 314 2 654 1 2.1
All high quality services 4,707 25 22,930 44 4.9
Other Services
Railroad ordinary 6,112 32 5,215 10 0.9
Intercity bus 8,395 43 23,716 46 2.8
Total 14,507 75 28,931 56 2.0
Combined High Quality and
Other Services
Railroad 7,300 38 15,050 29 2.1
Highway bus 11,600 60 3E,157 70 3.1
Air 314 2 654 1 2.1
All Travel 19,214 100 51,861 100 2.7
Note: Travel by non-commercial modes is excluded.
Source: Ibid, Table para. 3.01
3.05 Freight transport has also increased, albeit at a much slower
rate. Tonnage transported by the railways in the corridor increased from 15
to 20 million tons from 1974 to 1983.
C. The Railway Line
3.06 The Gyeongbu line is 445 km long. From Seoul to Suweon, about
30 km, there are four tracks, two of which are electrified and reserved for
suburban services. The rest of the line is double tracked and not electri-
fied. To Suweon, the line operates under CTC while from Suweon it is under
the Automatic Block System (ABS). The headway allowed by the latter varies
between 6.6 and 13.2 minutes depending on the type of trains and other
factors.
3.07 Signalling - The present ABS was installed seventeen years ago and
the quality of domestic manufacture was not up to international standards at
that time. There is still a large number of manually operated switches on the
main line. While the system was adequate for the conditions at the time, when
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trains were fewer and slower, it has now become old aid unreliable; also spare
parts are not easy to get. The number of system failures is inordinately high
at around 1,000 per year. This is about 10 times more than is considered
acceptable on other rail networks. While the number of accidents due to
system failures has so far been Limited by strict safety precautions, failures
disrupt the smooth running of trains and create delays, thus reducing line
capacity.
3.08 The length of blocks is presently 2 km, but because of the configu-
ration of the signals, a green light is obtained only whei the passing train
has travelled two bl.ock lengths or 4 km. The capacity of the present system
is estimated at some 120 trains per day each way at both ends of the line
(excluding the suburban section near Seoul) and 100 trains per day through the
mountainous central section.
3.09 Traffic and Operations. Freight and passenger traffic development
for the last decade is given in Tables 3.1 to 3.4 and summarized below:
GYEONGBU LINE RAII. TRAFFIC
Average annual
1974 1983 growth rate
Freight
ton (000's) 15,745 20,075 2.7
ton km (million) 1,883 2,119 1.3
Express Passengers
passenger (000's) 9,500 37,749 16.6
pkm (million) 1,916 6,914 15.3
Other Passengers
passenger (000's) 42,148 29,109 -3.7
pkm (million) 2,588 1,348 -6.7
Total Passengers
Passenger (000's) 51,648 66,858 3.0
pkm (million; 4,504 8,262 7.0
Source: KNR
In 1983, intercity ordinary train service was reduced drastically and the
number of passenger km (pkm) fell to only one quarter of its 1982 level. Now
the remaining passengers are mostly commuters, particularly between Seoul and
Suweon and to a lesser extent around Busan, Daegu and Daejon.
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3.10 Traffic on the line is about 732 passenger trains and 27% freight
trains. This proportion of passenger trains will increase even further and
may reach 85% by the end of the century. Passenger trains' top operating
speed is 120 km/hr on the flat sections, and that of freight trains about 85
km/hr. However, the latters' actual average operating speed is as low as 40
to 50 km/hr because of time lost waiting in passing sidings while being
overtaken by faster passenger trains. Traffic is rapidly approaching capacity
on most sections of the line. With the increasing demand for the better
express passenger services, line capacity would be reached in the next few
years.
3.11 Tariffs and Costs. The following services are offered in the
corridor:
Time Speed Fare
Seoul-Busan km/hr Won/pkm
Super-express (Saemaul) 4h45 92 31
Air conditioned express 5h05 83 19
Limited express 5hO5 82 14
Ordinary trains 7h00 45 6.8
Express highway bus 5h30 80 13
3.12 The higher class trains provide faster service at higher fares to a
few cities, while the ordinary trains stop at more towns and travel at much
slower average speeds. While the express trains have proven extremely profit-
able for KNR, the ordinary trains at controlled low tariffs are Losing money
(Table below). KNR has begun to reduce the ordinary train services, starting
with the Gyeongbu Line, in order to make space for the more profitable express
trains. Further discussion of this matter is in Chapter VI.
Net operating
Operating cost Revenue revenue (Loss)
per pkm per pkm per pkm
Super express 21.16 31.31 10.16
Air conditioned express 11.71 19.50 7.79
Limited express 10.13 13.65 3.52
Ordinary trains 24.42 6.80 (17.62)
- 13 -
IV. THE PROJECT
A. Project Objectives
4.01 In the fall of 1984, the Government requested Bank assistance in
financing the resignalling of the railway line in the Seoul-Busan or Gyeongbu
corridor. The proposed project results from the findings of the "Review of
Long-term Transport Investment Needs in the Seoul-Busar Corridor", a study
financed under the Seventh Railway Project (1836-KO) and prepared by Govern-
ment and Bank staff assisted by consultants. The project was therein assigned
the highest priority, insofar as it makes a significant contribution to the
safety of operations, provides increased capacity to the existing line, and
postpones other, more costly investments. The project would make a direct
contribution to the Government's overall plan for increasing transport capa-
city in this vital corridor (see para. 3.01), and also gives the Bank the
opportunity to pursue our dialogue with the Government and RNR on the institu-
tional strengthening of KNR; multi-modal transport planning; and the longer
term investment program which is being planned for this major transport
corridor.
B. Pro ect Scope and Description
4.02 The project forms part of a program (KNR's Management Improvement
Program) for the development of rail traffic in the Seoul-Busan corridor over
the next few years. This program is designed to reduce losses incurred for
ordinary train services as well as to improve other already profitable
services by decreasing unit cost of services offered. The program
comprises: (a) institutional and policy measures aimed mainly at ensuring
KNR's long-term viability; (b) measures to improve intermodal complementarity
and railway competitiveness; and (c) investments in track signalling to
increase capacity and in related rolling stock/equipment in line with trans-
port demand. The proposed loan will include funds to finance investments only
for parts of (c) together with associated technical assistance and training.
RNR and the Government will fund the other investments.
4.03 Parts (a) and (b) of the program will be implemented during the
1985-88 period. The main steps will include:
(a) In the short term (one to two years)
(i) The further discontinuation of ordinary trains in 1985, (4 were
discontinued in 1984, and 22 in 1983). EPB has to approve
proposed plan;
(ii) the closure of one uneconomic line and the conversion to private
sidings of two others;
(iii) the downgrading of fifteen full service railway stations into
"simple stations" which will result in significant reductions in
operaEing costs. Also, the privatization of ticket selling at
such stations will lower further staffing costs;
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(iv) an increase in the Seoul-Busan Corridor speed from 120 kph to
130 kph, and also in the number of air-conditioned coaches to
improve service to passengers;
(v) an increase in passenger train frequency by decreasing train
interval from 30 minutes to 20 minutes;
(vi)seeking EPB approval for 1985 tariff increases on freight
service and passenger services (5X), and the introduction of
flexible (volume dependent) freight tariffs. For the SHESRS
service, tariffs were increased by 23.7% on August 18, 1984;
(b) In the longer term (two to five years)
(vii) the formation of joint ventures with publicly held real estate
deve'lopment companies to rebuild 4 major stations (Seoul,
Daejon, Daegu and Yongsan) as commercial centers;
(viii) the introduction of bus feeder and car rental services, to
enable KNR to provide a more compLete service and improve KKR's
competitiveness in relation to bus transport;
(ix) marketing container services, pickup and delivery of freight
parcels;
(x) further reductions in staff through automatic fare collection
system and central traffic control system.
4.04 The project represents part (c) of the program, and would consist of
resignalling of the Seoul-Busan double-track line between Suweon and Daegu
(approximately 290 km) and installation of a CTC system that would increase
capacity to 170 trains per day. Power supply and communication systems would
also be supplied as well as train indicators, buildings, supervision and
training. Details are given in Annex 3. CTC already exists between Seoul and
Suweon where it was installed some years back in connection with opening of
suburban services on that part of the line. Between Daegu and Busan the sig-
nalling system (ABS) has been recently upgraded and therefore CTC installation
can be postponed for a few years. In installing the new system, the block
length will be e-dUced significantly from 2 km to 0.6 km, thus providing sub-
stantial capacity increase by enabling shorter distance between trains.
Because the existing system is old and substandard, the new system will also
be more reliable and safer. In addition, related rolling stock, equipment and
material to increase the number of trains in the corridor are part of the
project, although to be financed by Government.
4.05 At negotiations, assurances should be sought from Government that it
will take all steps necessary to facilitate the implementation of KNR's
Management Improvement Program for the Seoul-Busan corridor, and will consult
with the Bank from time to time to review and evaluate progress.
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C. Cost Estimates and Financing
4.06 Detailed designs are completed for all project works. Quantities
were derived from final engineering, and unit prices are based on current
world market prices for equipment to be imported. The cost of goods to be
procured locally and not to be financed by the Bank was estimaced on the basis
of current domestic prices, but shadow pricing was used for the economic
analysis. An exchange rate of W 860 to the US dollar was used for calculating
the US dollar equivalent costs. The estimated project cost, expressed in
January 1985 prices and including physical and price contingencies is about
US$178.3 million, of which US$64 million represents the cost of equipment to
be procured under ICB. A list of items to be financed by the proposed loan is
given in Table 4.1. The Government will finance materials and construction
costs from its own cesources.
4.07 Physical contingencies are included for alL project costs: 5% on
locally procured goods and civil works, and 1X on imported equipment. Annual
price contingencies were applied as follows: for local costs, 2.5% in 1985,
5Z in 1986, and 5.5% in 1987 and 1988; for foreign costs, 5% in 1985, 7.52 in
1986, and 8X in 1987 and 1988. Price contingencies represent 11.3% of base
cost estimates plus physical contingencies. Summary cost estimates are as
follows (detailed estimates are given in Table 4.2):
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SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS
(in January 1985 prices)
Foreign
exchange
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total as X of
---- (Won billion) ---- ---- (US$ million) ---- total
Signalling 14.6 37.5 52.1 17.0 43.6 60.6 72
Power supply 2.6 2.9 5.5 3.1 3.3 6.4 52
Communications 7.7 8.1 15.8 8.9 9.5 18.4 52
Equipment rooms 3.7 - 3.7 4.4 - 4.4 -
Supervision 3.3 - 3.3 3.8 - 3.8 -
Coaches 44.0 - 44.0 51.1 - 51.1 -
Materials 8.6 - 8.6 10.0 - 10.0 -
Total Base Cost 84.5 48.5 133.0 98.3 56.4 154.7 36
Physical contingencies 4.2 0.5 4.7 4.9 0.6 5.5 11
Price contingencies 6.9 8.7 15.6 8.1 10.0 18.1 55
Total Project Cost 95.6 57.7 153.3 111.3 67.0 178.3 38
4.08 Terms of the Loan. The loan will be made to GOK, and the proceeds
will be onlent to KNR through a subsidiary loan agreement at the same interest
rate and terms as the Bank loan. The signing of a subsidiary loan agreement
satisfactory to the Bank will be a condition of effectiveness. These arrange-
ments will be confirmed during negotiations.
D. Project Implementation and Procurement
4.09 The project will be implemented by KKR, which has experience of this
type of work. About 246 km of the network have already been equipped with a
similar CTC signalling system, and these works have been carried out
competently, on time, and without cost overruns. The project implementation
schedule is shown in Table 4.3. The project is expected to be completed by
December 31, 1988, and the Closing Date of the proposed loan would then be
June 30, 1989.
4.10 Civil works will not be financed by the Bank. All civil works
contracts will be awarded in accordance with the country's procurement pro-
cedures, which are satisfactory to the Bank. Procurement of equipment will be
subject to International Competitive Bidding (ICB) in accordance with Bank
guidelines for procurement, except for a number of small items worth less than
US$200,000 per order and totalling less than US$3 milLion, which would be
purchased on the basis of quotations received from three potential sup-
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pliers. All packages for equipment above US$100,000 will be subject to the
Bank's prior review of procurement documentation. In bid evaluation for
equipment contracts to be let through ICB, Korean manufacturers will be
allowed a preferential margin of 15% of the CIF cost of competing imports, or
the relevant prevailing level of customs duties, whichever is lower. For
items not financed by the Bank, Government procurement procedures will apply.
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES
(US$ millions)
Procurement Method Total
Project eLement ICB Other cost
Civil works 0.0 15.8 15.8
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Equipment and services 64.0 3.0 67.0
(64.0) (3.0) (67.0)
Coaches etc. 0.0 68.0 68.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Taxes 0.0 27.5 27.5
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Total 64.0 114.3 178.3
(64.0) (3.0) (67.0)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are the respective amounts financed by the
Bank. Figures also include contingencies.
E. Disbursement
4.11 Disbursement of the proposed loan would be as follows:
(a) 100% foreign expenditures of the CIF cost of imported equiDment and
materials;
(b) 100% local expenditures of the ex-factory cost of locally
manufactured equipme't and materials;
(c) 100% of the cost of technical assistance and overseas training.
4.12 Domestic transport from port or factory would not be eligible for
Bank financing. Any savings under the loan would be cancelled unless other-
wise agreed with the Bank. Disbursements against training and contracts for
goods and services valued at less than US$50,000 each would be made on the
basis of Statements of Expenditures (SOEs). To facilitate disbursements for
project expenditures, a revolving fund will be established with an initial
deposit of US$6 million, equivalent to about four months of expected expendi-
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tures. Documentation supporting the SOEs need not be submitted to the Bank
but should be kept in the project office in Seoul and made available for
review by the Bank's supervision missions.
4.13 An estimated schedule of disbursements is given in Table 4.4, where
a comparison is made with the Bank-wide profile for railway projects. Dis-
bursements are expected to proceed slightly faster than the standard profile,
mainly because of the nondiversified nature of the type of equipment to be
procured and because of the advanced state of project prepration. The sche-
dule is based on the assumption that the proposed loan would become effective
by September 1985.
F. Environment
4.14 No negative impact on the environment is expected from the proj-
ect. The project will contribute to the Government's efforts to make rail
transport an attractive alternative to the use of private cars, therefore
minimizing pollution.
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V. ECONOMIC EVALUATION
5.01 The corridor running from SeouL to Busan contains two-thirds of the
country's population and accounts for three quarters of the country's GNP. It
is thus imperative that the transport capacity be increased in pace with
transport demand in order not to stifle economic development. Since transport
investments are massive and have a long economic life, it is also important
that their timing and sequencing be well planned. The project is part of a
program (para. 4.02) to increase transport capacity in the corridor both for
rail and road transport. The project will permit more intensive use of the
existing infrastrucLure at relatively low cost, hus postponing for some years
more expensive major new infrastructure investments.
A. Traffic and Capacity
5.02 Traffic on the line ranges from 110 to 70 trains per day in each
direction on respectively the Northern section of the line, between Suweon and
Cheonan, and the Southern section from Daejon to Daegu (Table 5.1). The
respective line capacities with the present signalling system are 120 and 100
trains per day. Passenger traffic can be grouped by train service type into
Super-express (Saemaul, 5% of total passengers), express, both air-conditioned
and non airconditioned (74Z) and ordinary (21X). For the future, the number
of Saemaul trains, 8 to 11 per day depending on the section, and of ordinary
trains, 8 to 10 per day, has been assumed constant. Express passenger traffic
has been assumed to grow at 7X p.a. and freight traffic at 3X. The resulting
number of trains per day has been calculated in Table 5.2. Without the proj-
ect, capacity on the northern section would be exceeded in 1987 and on the
southern section in 1993. With the project, capacity is expected to be
increased by about one third, i.e. to 170 trains per day on the northern
section and 130 trains per day south of Daejon.
B. Economic Rate of Return
5.03 The present signalling system is in such a state of deterioration
that a major overhaul is needed to stop the rapidly ineveasing failure rate.
Without overhaul, the further increase of failure (para. 3.07) would gradually
reduce the line capacity by disturbing the schedules of trains and would also
have repercussions on other parts of the Line. Safet' standards, already low
by international criteria, would deteriorate seriously. The cost of the
needed overhaul is about 80% of the cost of the new system. The balance of
20% is attributable to the centralized traffic control system and block
shortening that would permit upgrading the line's capacity by about one-
third. The investment required for overhaul and the additional investment for
upgrading have been evaluated separately (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). It was
possible, however, to postpone for a few years the extension of the system all
the way to BusarL as some improvements were made a few years ago to the
Automatic Train Stop System (ATS) between Daegu and Busan and the capacity
increase will not be needed until the early 1990's.
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5.04 The pr3ject benefits are in terms of consumer surplus. The fact
that people are ready to pay more than the bus fare reflects the benefit they
derive from express train travel, e.g., comfort, speed, safety, etc.
Consequently, the benefits of increasing the capacity for the better passenger
services are measured in terms of willingness to pay for the services over and
above their costs. They are calculated as the difference between the cost of
the services and their revenues, and give an overall return of 41X on the
resignalling investment (Tables 5.6). The return on the overhaul part of the
project is 39% and the return on the capacity increase part of the project is
47% (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). The estimation is based on the assumption that
without the project, express train passengers only would be diverted to road,
but it is ikely that KNR wouLa in fact reduce the less profitable services
first. This likely overestimation is, however, more than balanced by the fact
that no account was taken of the increase in productivity of equipment
operating at an higher average speed and which will require proportionately
less rolling stock to accommodate higher traffic. Hence the operating costs
would be reduced, generating additional savings that have not been quanti-
fied. Of the increase of productivity, only the staff reduction of about 150
has been accounted for.
C. Sensitivity and Risks
5.05 The main area of risk for this type of project is traffic
forecasting. For the purpose of sensitivity analysis, the ERR has been
recalculated assuming lower traffic growth rates. Estimated costs for earlier
Korean railway projects have typically been realistic, or even on the kigh
side, with funds remaining in previous Loans after project execution. For the
sensitivity analysis, the ERR's of the capacity-increasing investments have
been recalculated with cost variations of +10%. The impact of the introduc-
tion of a high speed train operating on a separate line has been assessed on
the basis of a 1996 opening - the most likely date in terms of economic
feasibility and practicable construction schedules. Also shown is a
theoretical date (1992) at which the investment would be marginal.
Combined Overhaul Capacity
Economic Rate of Return investment of the line increase
x Z z
Base Case (no EST) 41 39 47
Express Passenger Traffic
Growth 3% p.a. 31 34 21
Express Passenger Traffic
Growth 5Z p.a. 36 37 34
Cost + 10% 38 36 45
- 10 44 42 50
HST operating from 1992 12 11 16
HST operating from 1996 36 34 42
The impact of substantially slower traffic growth rates does reduce the rate
of return but it remains acceptable, since benefits are only postponed. The
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introduction of the high speed train in 1996 would have minimal effect on the
rate of return. Not surprisingly. however, returns are highly sensitive to the
date of opening of such a service, though for all practicable dates they
remain satisfactory. The risk is therefore very low that the ERR would fall
to unacceptable levels.
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VI. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
A. Past Results and Present Financial Position
6.01 Over the last five years K/ NR has reported steadily improving
financial results, in terms of growth of operating revenue and net income and
improvement in its key financial performance ratios. Income statements are at
Table 6.2; the salient points are as follows:
1981 1982 1983 1984
Net Operating Revenue (5) 19 30 74
(Won billion)
Net Income (63) (40) (36) 3
Operating Ratio 101 96 94 87
Rate of ReturnY -0.3 1.0 1.4 3.2
at Revalued assecs.
6.02 This improvement took place during a period in which traffic grew
less than 10X. The key factors in RNR's financial performance were:
(a) timely and adequate action on tariffs, which have fully kept pace
with inflation 1I since 1980, when a major increase was effected to
bring rates more into line with costs;
(b) tight control over operating costs, which in real terms per-traffic-
unit remained constant over the period;
(c) marketing and other measures designed to shift traffic (especially
passenger traffic) towards the most profitable services.
6.03 KNR's effort's would have been even more successful had it been able
to make more progress in reducing the operating losses on ordinary trains.
These services - which operate on main corridors as weLl as on branch lines -
are run at considerably less than cost as a result of government policy
requiring the provision of a basic rail transportation service at prices
affordable to low income groups. Until 1980, government compensated KNR by
retroactive payments which, taking one year with another, covered the full
operating loss on the services. Following a substantial increase in tariff
1/ 1984 estimated.
2/ As measured by CPI.
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rates in 1980, however, the compensation has been reduced and now approximaces
the underrecovery of variabLe operating cost plus half the fixed operating
cost distributed to the service. Government intends that KNR should cover the
rest of the loss from efficiency improvements and profits on other services.
Thus, for example, in 1982 the ordinary trains lost W51.2 bilLion, of which
W35.4 billion was reimbursed by government in 1983 and the balance of W15.8
billion remained as a charge on KNR's other services. KNR's management has
already moved to contain the losses to the extent possible, for example by
diverting traffic (para. 6.02(c)), reducing the frequency of ordinary trains,
and eliminating certain stops. The scope for further such measures is now
Limited.
6.04 Carrying the residual loss on ordinary trains services has strained
KNR's cash flow in recent years. Since 1980, operational cash flow has been
barely sufficient to cover debt service - aLthough the trend, like that of
profitabiLity, is improving and coverage in 1984 reached 1.2. Most of the
capital expenditure of the past four years has been funded by debt, although
government has also assisted with modest capital contributions. Principal
services of loan funds have been Korea Development Bank (terms averaging about
10% with maturities up to 20 years) and onlending of foreign Loans and credits
raised by GOK, of which the Bank has been the largest single source. The
estimated balance sheet at December 31, 1984 shows a comfortable debt:equity
capitalization of 40:60, but liquidity is still tight with a current ratio of
only 0.7. Source and use of funds statements and balance sheets for 1981
through 1984 are at Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
B. Future Financial Performance
6.05 Financial projections for KNR through 1990 are at Tables 6.2 - 6.4
and the assumptions on which they are based are described in Table 6.1. They
indicate that, with a continuation of present government policies on ordinary
trains and with tariff adjustments on other services broadly in line with
inflation (although with some detailed adjustments to encourage traffic growth
on the most profitable operations), KNR's financial results will maintain the
improvement shown in the recent past. Operating revenue shouLd show continued
growth throughout the period, representing an overall rate of return between 4
and 5 percent from 1986. However, net income, although positive throughout
the period, would decline gradually from 1986 because of increasing interest
charges on loan debt. KNR's investments wilL continue to be funded mainly by
debt, although a limited self-financing capability will develop during the
period. Government capital contributions are expected to be phased out.
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KNR: FINANCING PLAN
(1985-90)
Won billion Z
Cash flow from operations 1,413
less working capital (24)
debt service 1,248 1,224
Net cash fLow 189 12
Government contributions 100 6
Borrowing 1,330 82
Capital expenditure 1,619 100
6.06 Despite the high percentage of borrowing in the financing plan, the
capitalization of KNR wiLl not change significantly over the period because of
the growth of equity resulting from the annual revaluation of assets. Debt
service can be expected to be adequately covered throughout the period. Under
previous loans, KNR has agreed not to incur new long-term debt unless debt
service would be covered at least 1.1 times; this agreement is carried forward
under the proposed loan.
6.07 The Bank recently agreed with KNR to adopt as the principal
indicator of financial performance a rate of return calculated on its commer-
cial services-that is, leaving out of account the losses arising on ordinary
passenger trains, which are largely beyond its control. Calculated in this
way the target rates are currently:
4% in 1985
5Z in 1986
5.5% in 1987
6% in 1988 and thereafter
The financial projections indicate that the targets for the early years will
be met, but that later in the decade more substantial tariff action or effi-
ciency gains may be required than have been assumed. This is also suggested
by the declining current ratio after 1987. RNR agreed under previous loans to
attain a current ratio of 1.5 by the end of 1988, and this agreement will be
carried forward. Given the limits of forecasting accuracy, however, the
differences from targets are not significant, and do not indicate a need for
revision of targets at this stage. KNR's progress wiLL continue to be
monitored through project supervision. At the same time, recognizing the
desirability of stablizing, and eventually reducing, the cost of improfitable
services, Government is to commission a study with consultant inputs, which
will examine (a) the effectiveness of ordinary trains in providing the service
to low-income travelers required by Government; (b) the possibility of
providing this, or alternative, serv;ces at lower cost; (c) the scope and
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mechanism for compensating [MR for any consequentiaL operating losses; and
(d) the significance of those losses for KNR's progress to eventual public
corporation status (para. 2.03). When the results of this study (to be
completed by the end of 1986) are available, the Bank will review with
government and KNR the implications for KNR's financial results and the
appropriateness of its performance measurements.
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VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.01 At negotiations, agreement should be reached with the Goverment that
it will take all the steps necessary to facilitate the implementation of KNR's
Kanagement Improvement plan for the Seoul-Busan corridor, and will consult
with the Bank from time to time to review and evaluate progress (pars. 4.05).
7.02 Execution of a subsidary loan agreement between the Government and
KNR will be a condition of loan effectiveness (para. 4.07).
7.03 Agreement having been reached on the above matters, the project is
suitable for a Bank loan of $67 million to the Republic of Korea for a term of
15 years including 3 years of grace, at the standard variable interest rate.
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KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Past Five-Year.Transport Development Plans and
Bank's Involvement (1962-81)
1. The First Plan (1962-66) devoted about half of transport invest-
ments to modernize and strengthen rail system capacity. Some 275 km of
industrial track were built (Tonghae Puku line); the conversion from steam to
diesel traction was started with large imports of Locomotives and diesel rail
cars; the fleet was modernized with Large imports of passenger and freight
cars while a large number were locally made. The Second Plan (1967-71), in
contrast to the First, devoted about 60% of cransport investments on highway
improvement. Some 655 km of expressways were built (Seoul-Busan, Ulsan-
Onyang, Seoul-Incheon and Daejon-Chonju) and the motor vehicles fleet
increased by nearly 100,000 units. rn the railway sector, 180 km of new
tracks were constructed tKyonggon line), and 50 km doubled-tracked (Honam
line); the fleet continued to expand with very large imports of diesel loco-
motives, passenger and freight cars, while more were built locally and rehabi-
litated. In the maritime sector, 800,000 CT of ocean-going ships and 130,000
CT of coastal ships were added, while Busan port stevedoring facilities were
expanded and Incheon and Ulsan ports were developed to acco =odate foreign
trade and to establish industrial coastal zones.
2. The Third Plan (1972-76) gave priority to the highway and maritime
sectors which receive 47% and 28%, respectively, of transport investments.
Some 490 km of two-Lane high-speed highways were built (Chonju-Busan, Wonju-
Gangreung), a national road maintenance organization was established and the
motor vehicles fleet expanded further by 210,000 units. In the maritime
sector, expansion of Busan and Mukho ports was started, while Incheon port was
developed further with the help of the Asian Development Bank (ADB); the fleet
was increased by some 1.3 million GT. In the railway sector, the line capa-
city increase continued through electrification of 320 km of heavy traffic
industrial lines (Chungang, Taebaek and Yongdong), and about 100 km of the
Seoul Metropolitan System (SMESRS); about 90 km of new tracks were laid
including 9.5 km of the first subway line in Seoul. In the aviation sector,
the international airports of Seoul Kimpo, Busan-Kimhae and Cheju were
expanded while ten jet liners were imported.
3. The Fourth Plan (1977-81) directed investments at the consolidation
of the basic transport infrastructure developed over the previous decade by
completing missing links, while also starting to promote better efficiency in
the operation of the transport system. The emphasis was placed on expendi-
tures for maintenance and renovations rather than on investments for new
facilities, with the major exception being a large-scale subway construction
program designed to alleviate urban transport congestion in Seoul City. The
basic highway network was completed by widening to 4 lanes the Masan-Busan
expressway and constructing the Daegu-Masan 85 km two-lane expressway. A
large-scale paving program for national roads was also started to bring Lhe
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paved portion to 68%, a target that was not reached partly due to reclassifi-
cation. In the railway sector, some 160 km of double tracking were completed
(Chungbuk and Gyeongbu lines) while Large numbers of eLectric cars, diesel
locomotives, passenger and freight cars and workshops were added. In the
maritime sector, the first Busan container port and Mukho coal port were
completed; and a second expansion of the Busan container area was started.
Incheon expansion, started in 1974, was completed in 1978 with the assistance
of ADB, through the addition of 20 deep-water berths, including 5 container
berths and 4 breakwaters.
4. The past achievements under development pLans in the transport
sector are very impressive and evidenced by large networks and fleet expan-
sions as well as modernization. However, funds expended under the national
plans reflect only part of total investments in the transport sector. Local
government investments, including those of provinces, counties, cities and
special cities, are not included in the plans unless they are funded at least
in part by the central budget. Omitting to take them into account would
considerably distort the assessment of the real magnitude of Korea's progress.
In particular, the four Special Cities (Seoul, Busan, Daegu and Incheon) road
investment programs were not shown in the Fourth Transport Plan although with
over W 700 billion at current prices (nearly US$1 billion-), 30% of which was
in Seoul City, they represented 37% of the country's overall road invest-
ment. In comparison, W 880 billion or 46Z were spent on national and express
highways and W 328 billion or 14% on provincial, county and city roads.
Performance Assessment
5. Broadly, the basic objectives of the transport development plans
were met as the network expanded fast enough to accommodate economic growth.
The general approach that gave priority to large investments to increase
system capacity was the most appropriate. The traffic grew so fast that
halfway measures, such as rehabilitation and improvement of the deficient
network of the 1960s, would have been insufficient and short-sighted.
6. The highway development policy was geared to develop a network of
roads to serve the short and medium distance traffic for which they have an
economic advantage over the railways. The Road Plan developed in 1968, in
consultation with the Bank, proposed a very ambitious program consisting of:
(a) the development through 1986 of a network of about 4,000 km of trunk
highways to form a grid of longitudinal and transversal axes linking the four
major gate ports of Incheon, Busan, Hogpo and Mukho toward inland centers, and
(b) the construction over a 10-year period of a 1,600 km two-lane expressway
network designed on separate alignments from the old roads, that could be
expanded when traffic volumes would require it. The program was 75% completed
and was determinant in localizing industries around Seoul and in most provin-
cial capitals, speeding the urbanization process as the population migrated
more easily from rural areas. The voluntary delay in improving the secondar-
and tertiary networks was justified in view of the highway requirements of the
industrialization policy.
7. Similarly, the railway investment policy was directed at strengthen-
ing its transport capacity for bulk freight and long distance passenger
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traffic where the railways have a comparative advantage. Investment in
modernization, double tracking and electrification of the most heavily used
freight line (14 million tons p.a.) enabled the railway to perform more
efficiently and to cope with demand. In particular, it helped increase
express train traffic from 1 billion passenger-km in 1971 to 11 Billion in
1983, to make large profits. However, to keep freight or recover local pas-
senger traffic that would be better handled by road transport, the railway
attempted to compete by investing in improvements that were economically not
so justified and had to apply a fares policy for ordinary trains that could
not cover operating costs. Also the Government forced the railways to invest
in infrastructure for other than strictly economic reasons such as double-
tracking of the Chung-Buk line.
8. Past investments, geared to the development of ports, including
those of Busan, Incheon and Ulsan, were necessary to cope with the large
increase of ocean-going freight and to attract heavy industries to coastal
areas. Also, the Busan concainerization program was effective in reducing
handling costs and expediting flows of cargo, although custom clearances still
impose lengthy transit delays. However, efforts were too restricted to the
major ports. A national port development policy remains to be introduced to
shape the future role, number and localization of lesser ports, particularly
to support coastal shipping which has scope for much expansion, given the
geography and political situation which make Korea a de facto island. Pro-
gress in the shipbuilding industry has been very instrumental in modernizing
the domestic fleet, which has proven to be a source of foreign exchange
earnings. An expansion of air transport was also timely in serving the many
foreign and local businessmen who were the artisans of Korea's fantastic
exports expansion that increased from 1962 to 1978 at an average of 27Z p.a.
The Bank's Involvement
9. The Bank has played an active role in advising and assisting the
Korean authorities in pursuing their transport objectives. Since 1962, the
Bank Group has assisted the KNR through eight railway projects amounting to
US$556 million. The first seven projects have been satisfactorily completed
and the eighth was substantially modified to account for slower imports of
coal. This project for Coal and Cement Distribution is to strengthen the
capacity of the railways, ports and inland terminals to cope with the expected
.ncrease in transport of these commodities, resulting partly from large coal
imports substituting for oil. Bank-supported investments have concentrated on
improved capacity and service for long distance passenger and bulk cargo
transport. The Bank has also maintained an active dialogue on the railway's
financial situation, investment plans, level and structure of tariffs. After
some deterioration in the 1970s, Government agreed to implement a financial
recovery plan for KNR as part of the Seventh Railway Project. A revised plan,
following the severe downturn of the economy in the early 1980s, was agreed
upon.
10. Since 1969, the Bank has financed six highway projects and a pre-
investment credit totalling US$695 million which have had a major impact in
assisting Government with the improvement and expansion of the national and
provincial road networks and with institution-building in the MOC and MOHA.
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Significant policy changes, relating to the highway sector, which were
effected through the highway projects, include the adoption of more appro-
priate road standards, revisions of regulations governing vehicle weights and
dimensions, and a modified government policy on toll roads. The MOC's organi-
zation to maintain the national road network was established and strengthened,
as well as that of MOHA now, through the provision of technical assistance and
road maintenance equipment. Korean consulting firms have benefitted through
their association with foreign consultants on the design of road projects.
11. Substantial assistance has also been extended for port develop-
ment. In part related to Korea's export drive, ports are seriously congested,
particularly at Busan, the biggest port. Containerization was introduced in
Busan with the assistance of the Bank under two port projects totalling US$147
million; the Saudi Fund for Development participated with the Bank in the
financing of the first Busan Port Project. A third port project designed as a
subsector loan is now being considered to further improve container handling
capacity at Busan and for supporting other maritime plans.
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Issues in the Transport Sector
A. Planning and Coordination
1. Despite considerable efforts, spatial planning of the transportation
system is still hindered by generally inadequate interagency coordination, a
comparatively Limited expertise in planning and economic appraisaL techniques,
and in the capacity to undertake appropriate longer-term pre-investment
studies. World Bank efforts to provide support and encouragement for these
activities are meeting with gradually more success than in the past. Although
a study financed under a Transport Credit had recommended in 1970 placing
transport planning and coordination in the Economic Planning Board (EPB), a
Transport Planning Office was set up instead in the Ministry of Transport
(MOT). In 1975, a Transport Coordination Committee (TCC) was set up with the
concerned ministries to improve coordination, but in practice, it did not
coordinate transport sector investments. More effective mechanisms are being
worked out. First, the Budget Bureau, located in EPB, exercises considerable
influence on year-to-year transport investment decisions through its budgetary
control powers. Further, a Bureau of Project Evaluation, established in 1976
in EPB and spurred by the necessity to cut back the public sector investment
program has shown interest in transport planning, although its function is
limited to reviewing individual major investment proposals submitted by
executing agencies on a piecemeal basis. The Bureau's capability in project
analysis has been strengthened under the Bank's 1981 Structural Adjustment
Loan. Moreover, a study to integrate highway investment planning between
highway agencies has just recommended new mechanisms and criteria for
selecting investments in line with economic and social priorities. A similar
approach is being discussed for ports.
2. Through various projects, the Bank has supported technical
assistance for a range of feasibility and planning studies relating to
national transport development, urban transportation needs, and inter-modal
alternatives aLong major traffic axes (such as the Seoul-Busan corridor), in
addition to more conventional engineering design work for preparing
projects. The record of accomplishment has been good although, in some areas,
agencies showed a pattern of slower progress, reflecting in part the
difficulties of sectoral planning and transport coordination in the Korean
context. The promotion of the local transport consulting industry was quite
effective. A Korean Institute is jointly responsible with foreign firms for
economic aspects of recent multimodal studies. Korean consultants are
assuming the largest share of the design work and are given supervision
responsibilities for implementing Bank's railroad, port and road projects.
The development of a competent consulting industry in the transport sector is
likely to lead to significant import substitution and export of such services.
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B. Energy Conservation
3. Energy is a key factor in the development of Korea and the large
petroleum imports are a major cause of Korea's balance of payment deficit.
Although only 20Z of fuel consumption is in the transport sector, the share is
expected to increase drastically with motorization. Accordingly, one of the
current 5-year transport plan's objectives, supported by the Bank, is to help
conserve energy. Efforts are directed at modifying energy consumption
patterns by shifting traffic to most fuel efficient modes such as railways and
coastal shipping. However, the potential for savings is far from being
realized. The Government has recognized the need to focus on institutional
responsibility and prepare a coordinated program to increase energy efficiency
in each potential areas. The Ministry of Energy and Resources (MOER) as
agreed with the Bank, under the recent Highway Sector Project, is responsible
for coordinating, managing and monitoring actions for conservation of energy
used in the transport sector. Transport agencies concerned have agreed to
prepare and submit plans to establish energy conservation policies and goals
for the near term. Among those are being considered measures to improve
operations and freight consolidation for road, rail and maritime transport
services and provide incentives to manufacture technical devices and equipment
that are more fuel efficient. HOER will assist in the implementation of these
policies, monitor achievements through periodic reviews and establish staff
training programs.
C. Pricing and Regulations
4. Pricing policy and the regulatory framework have been a feature of
Bank-government dialogue for many years. In the 1970s, emphasis was given to
supporting Government's efforts to establish agencies, such as KNR and KMPA on
a sound financial basis, with investment programs tied to appropriate tariffs
and charges for railways and ports. The role of the Bank has been quite
effective, although the priority given to reducing inflation in the past two
years has led to some reluctance to raise tariffs - for example for rail - in
line with changes in costs. The Bank has also assisted GovernmenLt in the
review of transport and traffic regulation, notably in regard to licensing of
common carriers, road vehicle taxation, axLe loading and similar issues
relating to road transportation. Studies on trucking regulation and road user
charges are about completed and will recommend important changes to liberalize
licensing and raise taxation on diesel fuel.
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Proposed Signalling Project
The proposed signaLling project is extensive and includes the
elements noted below.
(a) Modernization of the signalling system from Suweon to Tongdaegu on
the Kyongbu Line, 285.6 km.
- Provide interlocking and power-operated switches at 43
stations;
- Install single direction ABS between stations of the three-
block, four-aspect type and provide for reduced operating
headway between following trains;
- Install automatic train stop equipment at all wayside signals.
(b) Provide for remote control (CTC) of interlockings in two and
ultimately in three sections.
- Extend the existing Seoul Region CTC control from Suweon to
Pyongtaek, a distance of 33.9 km, by an additior. tc7 the present
panel;
- Daejon Region, Pyongtaek to Tongdaegu, 251.7 km to be
controlled from a new panel in Daejon;
- In the future, control Tongdaegu to Busan from a third control
center.
(c) Provide computer-aided dispatch facilities for the above CTC
systems.
- For the Seoul Region CTC control center including the enhance-
ment of the existing Seoul-Suweon section;
- Daejon Region, Pyongtaek to Tongdaegu.
Cd) Provide a supervisory indication panel for the above control centers
in KNR headquarters.
(e) Install or improve warning systems at 118 level crossings, Suweon to
Tongdaegu.
(f) Install platform train indication and annunciators at nine passenger
stations.
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(g) Provide a cable communications system for voice and data necessary
to support the new signalling system.
(h) Install hot box detectors at three stations.
(i) Install a power distribution system for signalling purposes.
ANNEX 4
- 35 -
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Selected Documents and Data Available in Project File
1. Technical Specification for Supply of Equipment and Materials for
Kyongbu line, KNR, January 1985, 325 pages, plus drawings.
2. Railway Signalling System, KNR, January 1985, 31 pages.
3. Assessment of Proposed Signalling for the Seoul-Busan Corridor
Korean National Railroad, Canadian Pacific Consulting Services, Ltd., March,
1985.
4. CTC Project Schedule of Kyongbu Line (Suwon to Tongdaegu). Detailed
project cost summary and comparison of costs of signalling overhaul and
capacity increase, KKR, December 18, 1984.
5. Revised 5th Five Year Investment Plan of KNR.
6. Quantified evaluation of KNR's danagement Improvement Plan
(1983-85).
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Growth Trend of Domestic Freiaht Traffic (1961-82)
(Unitel 1,000 tonal million tons-km)
1961 1966 1962-66 1971 1967-71 1976 1972-76 1981 1977-81 19R2
Traffic Z Traffic I In- Traffic X Z in- TraffLc % X in- Traffic 2 X in- Traffic I
volume share volume share crease volume share crease volume share crease volume share creame volume share
Tonnage
aLlways 15,373 47.9 24,064 46.9 9.4 31,955 25.1 5.8 43,629 1i 8 6.4 48,761 12.1 2.2 47,437 11.0
hlighways
Commercial N/A - N/A - - 73,934 58.0 - 93,751 38,2 4.9 104.256 26,0 2,1 108.576 25.2
Private & gov't. N/A - N/A - - 10,320 8.1 - 94,439 38.4 55.7 226,547 56.4 19.1 247,575 57.6
Subtotal 15,299 47.6 24,528 47.8 9,9 84,254 66.1 28,0 188,190 76.6 174.4 330,803 82.4 11.9 356,151 82.8
Maritime 1,44Z 4.5 2,686 5.3 13.2 11,263 8.8 33.2 13,829 5.6 4.2 22,206 5.5 9.9 26,454 6.2 W
Aviation 
- - - - - 7 - 49.1 5 - (5.7) 18 - 28.5 30 -
Total 32,114 100.0 51,278 1(0.0 9.8 127,479 100.0 20.0 245,653 10n.0 542 401,788 J2.!. 1023 430.072 lOO1O
Tons-km
Railways 3,486 88,2 5,450 81,6 9,3 7,841 48.9 7.5 9,728 44.h 4.4 10,815 37.5 2.2 10,892 36.9
Highways
Commerceal N/A - N/A - _ 3,302 20.6 - 4,374 20.0 5.8 4,868 16.9 2,2 5,n97 17.2
Private & gov't. N/A - N/A - - 237 1.5 - 2,172 10.0 55.7 5,217 18.1 19.2 5,674 19.2
Subtotal 323 88.2 558 8.4 11.6 3,539 22.1 44.7 6.546 30.0 13.1 lo0n.s 35.0 9.1 10,771 36.4
tMritime 141 3.6 672 10.0 36,7 4,653 29.0 50.2 5,513 25.4 3.5 7,927 27.5 7.5 7,881 26.7
Aviation 
- - - - - 2 - - 2 - (2.5) 7 - 26,5 II -
Total 3,950 100.0 6.680 100.0 11.1 J16905 LOO.o 19.1 21,809 100.0 6.4 28,834 10n.0 5.8 29.555 100.0
Sourcous (1) Flfth Flve-Year Economic and Social DevelopMent Plan, TransportatLon Sector Plan (1982-86), December 1981, Transportation Sector Planning
Task Force, HOT, Korea, pp. 2-3.
(2) Statistical Yearbook of Trnnsportatinn - 1981, HOT, Korea, pp. Ill, 113, 155, 157.
(3) Statistical Yearbook of Transportaton - 1971, NIOT, 'orea, ppr 76-77, 10l.
(4) Statistict. Yearbook of Tranaportstlon - 1982, NOT, Korea, pp. 10-II, 159, 161.( H) lesion to Korea.
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Growth Trend of Domestic Passenger Traffic (1961-82)
(UniLtat 1,000 passengers; Illion page-km)
1961 1966 1962-66 1971 1967-71 197G 1972-76 1981 1977-81 1982
Traffic Z Traffic 2 X in- Traffic X S in- Traffi. X 2 in- Traffic 2 Z In- Traffic Z
volume *hare volume share crease volume share creame volume share crease volume share crease volume share
PFapengers
Rahiways
Rail intercity 88,291 13.0 138,299 8.3 9.4 128,159 4.1 (1.5) 148,562 2.8 3.0 268,364 2.9 13.1 282,022 2.9
Seoul suburban N/A - N/A - - N/A - 100,107 1.9 - 172,765 1.9 10.7 161,548 1.6
Subtotal 88,291 13.0 138,299 8.3 9.4 128,159 4.1 (1.5) 248,669 4.7 14.2 441,129 4.8 12.2 443,570 4.5
Subway - - - - - - - - 33,914 0.6 - 88,326 1.0 21.1 89,298 0.9
Hlghways
Intercity N/A - 277,078 16.7 - 339,886 10.7 4.2 651,624 12.2 13.9 910,657 9.9 7.0 978,402 10.0
Urban N/A - 1,234,480 74.6 - 2,694,343 85.0 16.8 4,399,359 82.4 10.4 7,772,473 84.2 12.0 8,280,850 84.5
Subtotal 586.864 86.4 1,511,S58 91.3 20.8 3,024,229 95.7 14.9 5,050,983 94.6 10.8 8,683,130 94.1 11.4 9,259,252 94.5
La
Hbritime 3,743 0,6 5,909 0.4 9,6 6,371 0,2 1.5 5,994 0.1 (1.2) 9,230 0.1 9.0 9,602 0.1
Aviation 62 - 192 - 25.4 1,105 - 44.8 795 - (6.8) 1,555 - 14.4 1,844 -
Total 678,960 100.0 1,655,958 100.0 19.5 3,159,864 100.0 1338 5.340,355 100.0 11.1 9,223,370 100.0 11.5 9,803,566 100.0
Rs ways
Rail lntercity 5,372 53.0 8,665 42.5 10.0 8,750 27.1 0.2 12,441 21.2 7.3 16,552 18.2 5.8 15,838 16.5
Seoul suburban N/A - N/A - - N/A - - 1,864 3.2 - 4,976 5.4 21.7 5,196 5.5
Subtotal 5 372 53.0 8,665 42.5 10.0 8,750 27.1 0.2 14,305 24.4 10.3 21,528 23.6 8.5 21,034 22.0
Subway - - - - - - - - 388 0.7 - 1,258 1.4 26.5 1,309 1.4
Highways
Intercity N/A - N1A - - 11,936 37.0 - 25,030 42.7 16.0 35,559 39.0 7.3 38,211 39.9
Urban N/A - N/A - - 10,981 34.1 - 18,369 31.3 10,8 31,756 34.9 11.6 33,899 35.4
Subtotal 4.618 45.5 11,464 56,2 19.9 22,917 71.1 14.9 43, 399 74.0 1.6 67.315 73.9 9.2 72,110 75.3
Iaritime 136 1.3 196 1.0 7.6 256 0.8 5.5 249 0.4 (0.6) 480 0.5 14.0 610 0.6
Aviation 18 0.2 55 0.3 25,0 314 1.0 41,7 276 0,5 (2.6) 557 0.6 15.1 654 0.7
Total 10,144 100.0 20,380 100.0 15.0 32,237 100.0 9.6 58,617 100.0 12.7 91,138 100.0 9.2 95,717 100,0
Sourcesa (1) Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Develoent Plan, Transportation Sector Plan (1982-86), December 1981, Transportation Sector Planning Task
Force, KOT, Korea, pp. 2-3.
(2) Statistical Yearbook of Transportation - 1981, MOT, Korea, pp. 16-17, 60-63, 110-113.
(3) StatLetical Yearbook of Transportation - 1973, NOT, Korea, pp. 76-77.
(4 statistical Yearbooo or Transportation - ISS2, MOT, Kores, pp. 8-9.
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Comparison of Investmnt nLan, (1977-81 and 19.82-86)
(lillion won
7he Fourtb Plan (1977481) Ia /c l he Iif th Plan (1982-86) /b
Investment requiremnto Investmtt requirements
lormig COq3oUs- Foreiun Composi-
Dometic cap!tal tion ratlo Dometlc capital tton ratio
Transport invest mnt capital (USS Ulu) Total (X) capital (USS sin) Total (M)
Raily 289.9 231.7 402.1 14.5 894.3 715.6 1,330.8 13.4
(719.0) (574.6) (997.2)
Highway 1,141.0 174.9 1,225.6 ".0 3,568.9 245.8 3,718.8 37.4
(2,829.7) (433.8) (3.039.5)
Rad /d 373.1 174.9 457.8 16.4 1,175.0 220.8 1,309.7 13.2
(925.3) (451.2) (1,135.3)
Vehicles /s 741.2 - 741.2 26.6 2,307.6 - 2,307.6 23.2
(1.838.2) C-) (1,838.2)
Otbers 26.6 - 26.6 1.0 86.3 25.0 101.5 1.0
(S6.0) t-) (66.0)
Ports and ships 557.4 902.3 994.1 35.7 1,693.2 1,576.9 2,655.1 26.7
(1,382.4) (2,237.7) (2,465.4)
uiips 358.8 773.6 733.3 26.3 1,228.6 1,365.2 2,061.4 20.7
(889.8) (1,918.5) (1,818.6)
Parts and facilities 200.6 128.7 260.8 9.4 464.5 211.7 593.7 6.0
(497.5) (319.2) (646.8)
AvLiation S1.4 15.5 5.9 2.1 175.4 687.0 594.5 6.0
(127.5) (38.4) (146.1)
Subsay 54.1 97.0 101.0 3.6 1,324.5 509.8 1,635.0 16.5
(134.2) (240.6) (250.5)
Waterwy 1.9 - 1.9 0.1 5.0 - 5.0 -
(4.7) - (4.7)
Total 2 095.7 1 421.4 2.783.6 100.0 7,661.3 3,735.1 9.939.7 100.0
(3525.1) (6.903.4)
Total capital expenditure 14,188.0 10,000.0 19,028.0 59,000.0 23,673.4 72;100.0
(35,186.2) (24,800.0) (47,189.4)
Total transport investt
as S of total capital
expenditure 14.8 14.2 14.6 13.0 15.8 13.8
/a 'Me Fourth Plan figures are in 1975 constant value.
/b 5he Pifth Plan figures are in 1980 constant value.
/c The figures in parenthases indicate the 1980 constant value.
Jd Including construction, repalr and loan repayment of national roads only.
/e IncInding nev vebicles additional to the fle t and replacement for scrapped vehicles.
Note: GNP deflator: 1975 - 100. 1980 - 247.9.
Sources: (1) ThM fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-81), EPB, Korea, 1976, pp. 140-141, 152-153.
(2) The Fifth Five Year Economic and Social Developoant Plan - Transport Part for Implementation (1982U6),
NOT. Korea. October 1981, p. 51.
(3) Transport Past of the Investment Plan, EPB, Korea, October 12, 1981, pp. 8, 17, 26.
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KORRA
SEOUL-BUSAS CORRIDOR PROJECT
Korean Hational Rallroad (INR)
MR Intercity Passengtm Traffic: 1966-84 Actual and 1985586 Forecat
Number of pasenters (million) Paosnm r-bu cuillion) Averane distance (ka)
Com- Long dil- h1U- CoG- Lon dil- ali- CorN- Long die- MEi-
muter tane /a tary Total outer taoe /a tary Total muter tance /a tary Total
Actual
1966 38.40 98.00 1.90 138.30 830 7,288 546 8.66 21.61 74.37 287.37 62.65
Second FTP
1967 41.60 108.40 1.90 151.90 883 8,150 543 9,576 21.23 75.18 285.79 63.04
1968 38.70 110.60 1.60 150.90 828 9,280 482 10.590 21.40 83.91 301.25 70.18
1969 37.90 114.80 2.00 154.70 799 9,680 598 11,077 21.08 84.32 299.00 71.60
1970 38.20 91.40 1.70 131.30 854 8,425 539 9.818 22.36 92.18 317.06 74.78
1971 41.40 85.20 1.60 128.20 940 7.300 510 8,750 22.71 85.68 318.75 68.25
ThIrd FTP
1972 26.30 109.20 1.60 137.10 629 8.914 519 10,062 23.92 81.63 324.38 73.39
1973 22.50 118.90 1.60 143.00 552 9,681 487 10,720 24.53 81.42 304.38 74.97
1974 20.60 117.60 1.60 139.80 £81 .581 471 10.533 23.35 81.47 294.38 75.34
1975 15.10 122.00 1.40 138.50 326 10,626 434 11.386 21.59 87.10 310.00 82.21
1976 17.20 130.10 1.30 148.60 367 11.678 395 12,440 21.34 89.76 303.85 83.71
Fourth FmP
1977 17.40 143.50 1.30 162.20 380 13,782 401 14,563 21.84 96.04 308.46 89.78
1978 18.20 155.70 1.70 175.60 402 15,670 516 16,588 22.09 100.64 303.53 94.46
1979 19.60 162.10 1.30 183.00 434 16.253 399 17,086 22.14 100.27 306.92 93.37
1980 18.90 164.90 1.20 185.00 428 16.376 400 17,204 22.65 99.31 333.33 92.99
1981 18.00 153.50 1.30 172.80 410 15,740 403 16.553 22.78 102.54 310.00 95.79
Fifth FYP
1982 17.00 143.30 1.20 161.50 405 l5,051 381 15.837 23.82 105.03 317.50 98.06
1983 16.30 136.30 1.00 153.60 400 15,363 310 16.073 24.50 112.66 310.00 104.57
1984 14.60 131.10 1.40 147.10 376 15,190 396 15.962 25.70 115.90 283.10 108.50
Forecast
1985 15.70 141.60 1.20 158.50 376 16,947 372 17.695 23.95 119.68 310.00 111.64
1986 16.00 148.00 1.20 lbS.20 383 17,976 372 18.731 23.94 121.46 310.00 113.38
/A See *nalymis by type of service, Table 2.2.
Source: MID/nk.
KOREA
SEOUL-WSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
lorean lattonal Rllroad (l)
DQR Lona-Dletance lterclty PAeuanu.r traffic by Typ of Service
1971-84 Actual and 1985/86 Foreceet
*Nber of posmsnae s (uiljion) _GIa;O, -ba (uillion) AVOrage diatao (VbA)
Se. L ated G!greAG Od lae expres _Llott"""I s Ord.
Spec. ~~ Hon-~ Sb--No Ord. Spec Non- Sub- Ord. Spec. Ib- S- 0rd.
sxp. A/C A/C tetal *xp. Ord. Total amp. A/C A/C total exp. Ord. Total *xp. A/C A/C total *xp. Ord. Total
Actual
1971nrr 0.30 - 3.80 3.80 - 81.70 85.80 117 I 1,071 1.071 - 6,112 7,300 390 - 282 282 - 75 85
Third FYP
197r- 0.40 - 5.90 5.90 - 102.90 109.20 47 - 1,653 1,653 - 7,115 8.915 368 - 280 280 - 69 82
1973 0.50 - 7.60 7.60 - 110.80 118.90 183 - 2,105 2,105 - 7,395 9.681 366 - 277 277 - 67 81
1974 0.60 - 8.80 8.80 4.40 103.80 117.60 234 - 21224 1,214 940 6,163 9,581 390 - 253 253 214 60 81
1975 0.80 - 11.50 11.50 4.70 104.80 121.80 298 - 2.862 2,862 1,004 6,463 10,627 373 - 249 249 214 62 87
1976 1.30 - 15.00 15.00 5.40 108.30 130.00 465 - 3,673 3,673 1,025 6,516 11,679 358 - 245 245 190 60 90
Fourth FiPEI7T 1.60 0.40 27.40 27.80 8.50 105.60 143.50 550 122 6,291 6,413 1,357 5,463 13,783 344 305 230 231 160 52 96
1978 1.90 1.60 34.40 36.00 9.40 108.40 155.70 645 461 7,852 8,313 1,287 5,425 15,670 339 288 228 231 137 50 101
1979 2.40 2.00 36.10 38.10 8.70 112.90 162.10 772 530 8,252 8,782 1,207 5,492 16,253 322 265 229 230 139 49 100
1980 2.50 3.00 34.30 37.30 9.00. 116.10 164.90 797 727 7.739 8,466 1,230 5,883 16,376 319 242 226 227 137 51 99
1981 2.20 8.80 30.90 39.70 5.30 106.30 153.50 722 2,040 6,793 8,833 616 5,569 15,740 328 232 220 222 116 52 103
FIfth I'rP
1982 1.90 9.70 33.40 43.10 0.40 97.90 143,30 641 2,210 6.984 9.194 47 >,169 15,051 337 228 209 213 1I1 53 105
1983 1.90 10.80 37.90 48.70 - 85.90 136.50 607 2,585 7,680 10,265 - 4,491 15,362 319 239 203 211 - 52 113
1984 1.90 13.10 40.70 53.80 - 73.40 131.10 589 3,070 7,947 11,017 - 3,582 15,190 313 234 195 206 - 47 116
Forecast
1985 2.00 14.20 42.70 56.90 - 82.70 141.60 653 3,201 8.707 11,908 - 4,386 16,947 327 225 204 209 - 53 120
1986 2.20 16.90 45.70 62.60 - 83.20 148,00 718 3,715 9,131 12,846 - 4.412 17,976 326 220 200 205 - 53 121
Soureeg KN&/Bnk.
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Table 2.3
KOXEA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Korean National Railroad (KNR)
MNR Seoul Urban (SMESRS) Passenger Traffic
1971-84 Actual and 1985/86 Forecast
Number of passengers (million) Passenger-km Average dis-
Commuter Noncommuter Total (million) tance (km)
Actual
1974 5.90 22.70 28.60 545 19.06
1975 17.10 65.30 82.40 1,540 18.69
1976 19.10 80.50 99.60 1,865 18.72
Fourth FYP
1977 25.90 113.50 139.40 2,536 18.19
1978 318.30 157.10 195.40 3,466 17.74
1979 50.20 190.50 240.70 4,300 17.86
1980 50.00 195.70 245.70 4,436 18.05
1981 56.20 212.50 268.70 5,005 18.63
Fifth FYP
1982 64.60 217.40 282.00 5,196 18.43
1983 78.00 237.70 315.70 5,615 17.79
1984 87.60 254.30 341.90 5,916 17.30
Forecast
1985 91.80 286.30 378.10 6,944 18.37
1986 100.20 313.80 414.00 7,604 18.37
Source: KNR/Bank.
)-
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SEO-IUSAN COIBOR MO1!CT
Korean Umtioel Eailroa (Ku)
UK Freight Traffics 1966-84 Actual and 1985S86 Forecast
("KElMN to="
Ikior cemodities Others
f-rti- Sub- enal Private Con- 151-
Coal Cment Oro Oil lser Grain total cargo car retu timner tary MM Total
Actual
1966 10.50 1.70 1.10 0.90 1.20 1.20 16.60 4.40 - - 2.10 0.90 24.00
Second FTP
1967 11.20 2.20 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.30 18.70 S.60 - - 2.30 0.80 27.40
1968 9.70 3.20 1.70 1.70 1.50 1.60 19.40 5.90 - - 2.60 1.00 29.10
1969 10.40 4.40 1.70 2.10 1.20 1.40 21.20 5.60 - - 2.70 1.20 30.70
1970 12.10 4.90 1.80 2.40 1.10 1.30 23.60 5.00 - - 2.10 1.00 31.70
1971 12.20 5.80 1.60 2.50 1.10 1.40 24.60 4.60 - - 1.90 0.90 32.00
Third FTP
1972 11.30 6.00 1.50 2.20 1.30 1.60 23.90 4.60 - - 2.40 0.70 31.60
1973 13.60 7.50 2.30 2.70 1.50 1.60 29.20 5.50 - 0.20 1.70 1.00 37.60
1974 15.10 7.80 2.90 2.70 1.90 1.30 31.70 5.10 - 0.20 1.30 1.10 39.40
1975 16.70 9.00 3.00 3.10 2.20 1.00 35.00 3.50 1.50 0.20 1.40 1.10 42.70
1976 16.10 10.20 3.40 3.10 1.80 1.30 35.90 3.20 1.60 0.30 1.50 1.30 43.80
Fourth FmP
1977 17.50 10.30 3.20 3.50 2.10 1.20 37.80 4.60 1.90 0.50 1.50 1.30 47.60
1978 17.90 10.90 3.10 3.80 2.20 1.20 39.10 4.80 2.00 , 0.60 1.50 1.60 49.60
1979 18.00 11.20 3.40 4.30 2.10 1.10 40.10 4.70 2.00 0.60 1.50 2.00 50.90
1960 18.60 9.50 3.40 3.90 1.70 1.00 35.40 4.80 1.30 0.40 1.40 2.20 49.00
1981 21.40 6.40 3.90 3.20 1.90 0.60 39.40 4.40 1.60 0.50 1.30 1.60 48.80
Fifth Tp
1982 19.60 9.50 3.90 2.70 1.80 0.60 38.10 4.30 1.50 0.60 1.40 1.50 47.40
1983 20.10 11.10 4.10 2.60 1.60 0.70 40.20 4.90 1.60 0.80 1.40 1.60 50.50
1984 23.20 10.90 4.30 2.90 1.60 0.70 43.60 4.60 1.60 0.80 1.40 1.70 53.70
Forecast
1985 21.30 12.40 4.20 2.60 1.30 0.70 42.50 5.80 1.70 0.90 1.40 1.40 53.70
1986 22.20 12.90 4.30 2.60 1.30 0.70 44.00 6.00 1.70 1.00 1.40 1.40 55.50
Average dis-
tance, 1986 220 215 247 220 275 330 225 285 190 435 285 113 233
Too-km. 1986 4,884 2,774 1.062 572 358 231 9,900 1.710 323 435 399 161 12.932
Note: Since 1977. gnerval cargo Includes slag and gype previously ieluded under ore. Slag and gypstu accounted for
0.8 m.llon tons in 1977 and 1.1 mIlllon ton ln 1979. Return of private cars. mostly oil tankers, are now shoun
separately from geeral cargo. XIL charges balf the tare weight at Class IIl freight rate for thLs traffic.
Source: XNR.
45 - Table 2.5
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Korean National Railroad (KNR)
KNR Traffic Forecasts to 1991
1986 1991 Growth rate
(Z p.a.)
Passenger-km
Saemaeul 718 704 -
Express /a 12,846 17,480 6.4
Ordinary 4,412 4,240 -1.0
Subtotal 17,976 22,424 4.5
SMESRS 7,600 10,600 7.0
Total 25,576 33,024 5.2
Ton-km 12,932 14,250 2.0/b
GRAND TOTAL 38,508 47,274 4.2
/a Based on passenger growth at 8% p.a. and average distance continuing to
decrease slightly.
/b Coal flat; cemet +3% p.a.; +4% p.a.; oil +3% p.a.; fertilizer flat; grain
flat; general cargo +2Z p.a.; containers +5Z p.a. and empty containers +3%
p.a.
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
Qyeongbu Line Passenger Traffic (1974-83)
( '000 passengers)
Express
A/C Ltd. Non-A/C Ordinary Sub-
Saemaeul express express express total Ordinary Other Commuter Total
Third FYP
1974 639 - 7,177 2,323 9,500 32,838 1,059 7,612 51,648
1975 825 - 9,246 2,774 12,020 26,900 1,008 3,251 44,004
1976 1,293 - 12,538 3,046 15,584 27,386 918 3,929 49,110
Fourth FYP
1977 1,566 431 22,651 3,695 26,777 23,809 926 4,005 57,083
1978 1,901 1,638 28,498 3,768 33,904 24,106 1,011 4,473 65,395
1979 2,324 1,720 30,479 2,978 35,177 25,281 963 4,985 68,730
1980 2,420 2,248 28,967 3,245 34,460 27,072 973 4,640 69,565
1981 2,184 7,032 23,735 3,472 34,239 36,376 979 4,620 68,398
Fifth FYP
1982 1,911 8,024 24,987 236 33,247 25,080 958 4,543 65,739
1983 1,837 9,158 28,591 - 37,749 21,997 789 4,486 66,858
1984
1985
1986
Source: KNR. Statistical Year Book, 1983.
_47_ Table 3.2
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIWDR PROJECT
Q'eongbu Line PassenRer Traffic (1974-83)
(mln passenger km)
Express
A/C Ltd. Non-A/C Ordinary Sub-
Saemaeul express express express total Ordinary Other Commuter Total
Third FYP
1974 234 - 1,580 336 1,916 2,094 132 128 4>504
1975 294 - 2,029 371 2,400 2,132 254 85 5,165
1976 442 - 2,691 387 3,078 2,106 241 98 5,965
Fourth FY?
1977 522 122 4,524 355 ' 001 1,600 254 111 7,488
1978 612 461 5,589 295 6,345 1,558 261 129 8,905
1979 732 466 6,003 187 6,656 1,608 269 145 9,410
1980 756 530 5,634 208 6,372 1,791 272 134 9,325
1981 677 1,543 4,439 223 6,205 1,790 275 135 9,082
Fifth FYP
1982 599 1,769 4,400 12 6,181 1,686 264 140 8,870
1983 560 2,107 4,807 - 6,914 422 217 149 8,262
1984
1985
1986
Note: This railway line in 444.5 km long and has 79 stations; the average distance
between two stations is 5.63 km.
Source: KNR, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
- 48 - Table 3.3
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
ryeongbu Line Passenger Traffic (1974-83)
average distance (km/pas.)
Express
A/C Ltd. Non-A/C Ordinary Sub- Ordi-
Saemaeul express express express total nary Other Commter Total
Third FYP
1974 366.20 - 220.15 144.64 201.68 63.77 124.65 16.82 87.21
1975 356.36 - 219.45 133.74 199.67 79.26 251.98 26.15 117.38
1976 341.84 - 214.63 127.05 197.51 76.90 262.53 24.94 121.46
Fourth FYP
1977 333.33 283.06 199.73 96.08 186.76 67.20 274.30 27.72 131.18
1978 321.94 281.44 196.12 78.29 187.15 64.63 258.16 28.84 136.17
1979 314.97 270.93 196.96 62.79 189.21 63.61 279.34 29.09 136.91
1980 312.40 235.77 194.50 64.10 184.91 66.16 279.55 28.88 134.05
1981 309.98 219.43 187.02 64.23 181.23 67.86 280.90 29.22 132.78
Fifth FYP
1982 313.45 220.46 176.09 50.85 185.91 67.22 275.57 30.82 134.93
1983 304.84 230.07 168.13 - 183.16 19.18 275.03 33.21 123.58
1984
1985
1986
Source: KNR, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
49 Table 3.4
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
GCyeongbu Line Freisht Traffic (1974-83)
Total Total Average
ton-km tons distance
(million) ('000) (km/ton)
Third FYP
1974 1,883 15,747 119.58
1975 1,750 15,938 109.80
1976 1,714 16,689 102.70
Fourth FYP
1977 1,928 18,592 103.70
1978 1,996 19,384 102.97
1979 2,042 20,492 99.65
1980 1,984 20,177 98.33
1981 2,009 19,465 103.21
Fifth FYP
1982 1,953 18,829 103.72
1983 2,119 20,075 105.55
1984
1985
1986
Source: KNR, Statistical Yearbook, 1983.
KORBA
SEOUL - BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
SlUnalling Coeponentl List ot Goods
(Won million. April 1985 priaes)
_................................ I ...................................... ................................................ ......................................................................................... _.............................._........._......._
VSLISTODS
1985 1986 1987 1988 Total
_._................................. --------------- .......... __.. ........ ... ..................... .... ............. ....................... _......... 
Local Foreign Total Looal Forelgn Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Looal Foreign Total
Sinallim
Control Center - - - - - - - - - 685 15507 16192 685 15507 16192
Interlookinga 1252 1412 2664 2339 2610 4949 2049 2388 4437 - -5640 6409 12050
Autoatlo Blook System (ABS) - - - 1819 5202 7020 1116 3663 4779 - _ * 2935 8865 11800
Automatto Train Stop (ATS) 44 241 285 97 562 658 94 539 633 . _ - 235 1342 1576
Level Crossings 36 49 85 232 381 613 61 108 168 - - - 329 538 867
Hot Box Detectors 2 192 195 2 192 195 2 192 195 - - - 7 54
Train Information System 15 195 210 36 584 620 63 864 927 _ _ - 114 1643 1756
Hiscelleaneous 729 67 796 2061 ¶49 2210 1630 283 1913 266 2096 2363 4686 2595 7282
Signalling Total 2078 2157 4235 6587 9679 16266 5015 8036 13051 952 17603 18555 14632 37475 52107
Power SUDD1Y
Substatlions 111 147 a59 15 55 69 68 40 116 - - - 194 250 444
Distribution - - - 1557 960 2517 4J6. 460 925 _ _ 2022 1419 3442
Station Equlpment - - - 259 506 765 143 113 256 - - - 402 619 1021
Soada Systen - - - - - - - - - 34 578 612 34 578 612
Power Supply Total 111 147 259 ¶831 1520 3351 676 621 1297 34 578 62 2652 2867 5519
Comunications System
Carrier Sytem t - - 249 ¶319 1569 206 582 788 - - - 455 1901 2356
Cable System . 5035 3351 8386 2102 1604 3706 - - - 7137 4955 12092
Dispatchers Phones * - - - - - - - - 90 1278 1368 90 1278 1368
Co_unioations Total - _ _ 5284 4671 9955 2308 2186 4494 90 1278 1368 7682 8135 15816
Ecuiceent Room& 782 - 782 865 - 865 1274 - 1274 833 - 833 3754 0 3754
Supervision 661 - 661 882 - 882 882 - 882 882 - 882 3306 0 3306
ORAND TOTAL 3633 2304 5937 15448 15870 31318 10154 10843 20997 2790 19459 22249 32025 48476 80501
.ouroe . ac _ mission . estimate. _0____......... ........................................................... _.
3ourost KNR andt mission setio tes. 04.29.85
KOREA
SIOUL S BUSt CORRIDOR PROJECT
Co.posltlon a d Cost lstiatos
V60T.OIN *----------------------------------------------------------- (Won biltion) ----------------------------------------------------------- (05 (millon) -----
1965 1966 19B7 1968 Total Totl
Local Foreign Totol Local Foreign Total Loonl Foroign Total LocQl Foreilp Total Local Foreign Total Local Foroei Toal
.................................................................................... ...................................................................................... .......................................... ______... -_
1, SignalLin4 2.08 3.l6 5.23 6.59 9.68 16.27 5.02 .0,O 13,05 0.95 17.60 16.56 14.63 37.46 52.t1 17.01 43.58 60.59
2. Power Supply 0.11 0.15 0.26 1.63 1.52 3.35 0.66 0.62 1.30 0.03 0.54 0.61 2.65 2.67 5.52 3.08 3.33 6.42
3. Comunication- 0.00 5.28 4.67 9.96 2.11 2.19 4549 0.09 1.26 1.37 7.66 6.13 15.2 65.3 9.56 16,39
4. tquipment Rooms 0.78 - 0,76 0.87 - 0.7 1.27 - 1.27 0.63 - 0,63 3.75 0.00 3.75 5.36 0.00 5.34
5. Superviaion 0.66 - o,66 0.86 - 0.66 066 - O0e6 0.65 * 0.8 3.30 0.00 3.30 3.54 0.00 3.64
sub-totol 3-63 2.30 5.94 15,45 IS.7 31.32 10.15 I0.e 21,00 2.79 19.46 22.25 32.02 546.8 60.50 37,24 56.37 93.61
S. Coacheb 12.55 - ¶3.55 10.47 - ¶0.7W7 10,57 - 10.57 43.95 - 43.95 51.10 - 51.10
6. HAterlkl4l etO. 2.52 * 2.52 2.02 - 2.02 2.02 - 2.02 2.02 * 2.02 6.57 9.96 . 9.96
total ¶6.70 2.30 21.01 27.93 I5,67 O3.60 22.63 10.6 33.46 15.27 19.46 34.73 84.54 56.46 133.02 96.30 56.n3 M5.67
Phyo. Conting. .0.94 0.02 0,96 1,50 0.16 1,56 1.13 0.11 1.24 0.76 0.19 0.96 5.23 0O.5 4.71 5.92 0.56 5.56
Uaelino Eatiuts 19.65 2.33 21.97 29.33 16.03 45.36 23.77 11095 34.72 16.03 19.65 35.69 66.77 56.96 137.73 103.22 56.93 ¶60.15
Prio Conting.
I per year 2.50 SOO 5.00 7.50 * 5,l0 60 5.50 6.00 *  ,
I oemnded 1.25 2.50 - 5.0625 693t5 -¶ 10565469 ¶7.39 - 16.66665 26o7611 - 7.79 17.68 11.31 t79 17.66 11.31
amount 0.25 0.06 0.30 1.56 1.43 2.92 2.52 1.90 5.52 2.67 5.24 7.94 6.92 6.66 15,56 6.05 10.07 18.11
Total. Prolet Cost ¶9.69 2.39 22.27 30.61 17.56 40,27 26.26 12.65 39.14 16.71 24.98 53-61 95.69 57,62 153.31 111.26 67.00 176.26
Souroeas KN1 and mission .stintes. Notest Custom duties of Woo 20.75 billion are Includd La Item I to 4 boove. 04.29.65 ;
IEobange ratel 3$1.00 a Von 660 Value Added Tax of Von 2.66 billion to inoluded La Item I to 6 abov, 
Physical contingenociso loalI * I5, toreign s 1t.
1KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR PROJECT
____________________________
Implementation Sohedule
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
* I a * i I I
1. Preliminary design s**** : a s t s
2. Detailed design and speoifications s ******* s s s s a
3. Prequalification f bidders I a ** s s s s s
4. Preparation of bidding dooument (OSROK) a a ** a s a s s
5. Call for bids s a ** s s s a a
6. Evaluation and signature of contract s a * a s : a
7. Appraisal s a * a a a a a
8. Negotiations s : * a a s a
9. Board s s ** a s a a a
10. Irmplementation a Suweon - Cheonan a s a*********** a a a
11. Implementation a Cheonan - Daejon a a a *************a a a
11. Implementation a Daejon - Daegu a s a a *
t a S * a t S
Table 4.4
- 53 -
KOREA
SEOUL-BUSAN CORRIDOR
Cumalative Disbursement Schedule /a
Cumulative
IBRD fiscal disbursement
year and Estimated disbursements profile
semester US$ mln cum Z for Korea
FY86
I - - - 0.8
II 2.8 2.8 4.2 5.5
FY87
I 10.1 12.9 19.2 14.0
II 10.2 23.1 34.5 26.1
FY88
I 7.4 30.5 45.5 40.4
II 7.5 38.0 56.7 55.1
FY89
I 14.5 52.5 78.4 68.2
II 14.5 67.0 100.0 78.9
FY90
I 87.0
II 93.0
FY91
I 97.1
II 100.0
/a Assumptions: Board date in fourth quarter FY85.
Proposed Closing Date: June 30, 1989.
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Number of Trains per day on Kyeongbu Line by Section and Forecast for 1986-96
(Number of trains as of end of 1984)
All types
Passenger Total of trains
Section Saemaeul Exp. Lt. exp. Ord. Baggage Total Freight 1984 1986 1992 1996
Seoul-Suweon 22 42 80 14 6 164 48 212 264 388 498
Suweon-Cheonan 22 42 80 14 6 164 54 218 264 404 516
Cheonan-Chochiweon 22 38 66 10 6 142 56 198 1
} 252 286 492 I
Chochiweon-Daejon 22 38 68 10 6 144 52 196 }
DaeJon-Kimcheon 16 32 34 12 4 98 38 136 186 288 366
Kimcheon-Dongdaegu 16 32 26 20 4 108 38 146 204 316 406
Dongdaegu-Samrangjin 12 54 36 12 4 118 25 143 1
)162 246 312
Samrangjin-Busan 12 44 36 20 4 116 25 141 }
Source: KNR (February 1985) and Seoul-Busan Transport Corridor Study, 1984. Train numbers are in both
directions, excluding SMERS. 1-
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COsts-Benefits Analysis for Signalling Overhaul Between Suweon-Daegu
Benefits
Suweon- Cheonan- DaeJon- Staff Total Net
Costs Cheonan Daejon Dongdaegu Saving Benefits Benefits
1985 3192 0 -3192
1986 18296 0 -18296
1987 12378 2422 1869 4291 -8087
1988 17104 3419 4089 1226 8734 -8370
1989 1360 4416 5536 4003 13955 12595
1990 1360 5271 6608 7940 19819 18459
1991 1360 6553 8215 11968 26736 25376
1992 1360 7551 9465 15735 32751 31391
1993 1360 8548 10716 17926 37190 35830
1994 1360 8548 11787 19719 40054 38694
1995 1360 8548 12680 21153 42381 41021
1996 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
1997 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
1998 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
1999 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2000 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2001 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2002 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2003 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2004 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2005 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2006 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2007 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
2008 1360 8548 12680 21511 42739 41379
Rate of Return (With 7% passenger grow-th rate) 38.91%
Note: Costs are estimated at 80% of total project costs.
Sensitivity analysis:
Rate of Return:
With 6% passenger growth rate 37.95%
With 5% passenger growth rate 36.98%
With costs +10% 36.30%
With costs -10% 41.98%
With high speed train operating from 1992 11.43%
With high speed traiL operating from 1996 34.21%
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Costs-Benefits Analysis for Capacity Increase Between Suweon-Daegu
Benefits
Suweon- Cheonan- Daejon- Staff Total Net
Costs Cheonan Daejon Dongdaegu Saving Benefits Benefits
1985 798 0 -798
1986 4574 0 -4574
1987 3094 735 735 -2359
1988 4276 1606 1606 -2670
1989 340 2532 834 600 3966 3626
1990 340 3519 1932 900 6351 6011
1991 340 4569 3099 900 8568 8228
1992 340 5687 4342 900 10929 10589
1993 340 6878 5664 1678 900 15120 14780
1994 340 6878 7071 3507 900 18356 18016
1995 340 6878 8569 5454 900 21801 21461
1996 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
1997 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
1998 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
1999 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2000 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2001 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2002 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2003 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2004 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2005 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2006 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2007 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
2008 340 6878 8569 7526 900 23873 23533
Rate of Return (With 7% passenger growth rate) 47.35%
Note: Costs are estimated at 20% of total project costs.
Sensitivity analysis:
Rate of Return:
With 6% passenger growth rate 40.62%
With 5% passenger growth rate 34.00%
With costs +10% 44.83%
With costs -10% 50.29%
With high speed train operating from 1992 16.14%
With high speed train operating from 1996 42.13%
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Costs-Benefits Analysis for Signalling Overhaul and Capacity Increase
Between Suweon-Daegu
Benefits
Suweon- Cheonan- Daejon- Staff Total Net
Costs Cheonan Daejon Dongdaegu Saving Benefits Benefits
1985 3990 0 -3990
1986 22870 0 -22870
1987 15470 3157 1869 5026 -10444
1988 21380 5025 4089 1226 10340 -11040
1989 1700 6949 6371 4003 600 17923 16223
1990 1700 8790 8540 7940 900 26170 24470
1991 1700 11122 11314 11968 900 35304 33604
1992 1700 13238 13807 15735 900 43680 41980
1993 1700 15426 16380 19605 900 52311 50611
1994 1700 15426 18858 23226 900 58410 56710
1995 1700 15426 21249 26607 900 64182 62482
1996 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
1997 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
1998 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
1999 1700 15426 21249 29037 900. 66612 64912
2000 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2001 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2002 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2003 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2004 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2005 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2006 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2007 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
2008 1700 15426 21249 29037 900 66612 64912
Rate of Return (With 7% passenger growth rate) 41.02%
Note: Costs are estimated at 100% of total project costs.
Sensitivity analysis:
Rate of Return:
With 6% passenger growth rate 38.59%
With 5% passenger growth rate 36.30%
With costs +10% 38.44%
With costs -10% 44.04%
With high speed train operating from 1992 12.47%
With high. speed train operating from 1996 36.10%
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KOREA NATIONAL RAILROAD
Assumption for the Financial Projections
General
1. Inflation at the following rates (percent):
CY: 85 86 87 88 89 90
2.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Income Statement
2. Traffic Projections as described in paras. 2.12-13 and Table 2.5.
3. Tariffs:
(a) Special express trains: no change;
(b) Air conditioned limited express trains: decrease of 3% p.a.
from 1986 to improve competitive position with air conditioned
buses and non-airconditioned trains;
(c) Ordinary trains: 10% p.a. increase in rates through 1986;
thereafter, the loss on the service will be held at not more
than 50% of fully distributed fixed costs, either by futher
tariff increases or government subsidies or both; and
(d) All other services: rate increases in line wlth assumed
inflation.
4. Operating Cost:
(a) Labor: productivity per employee is assumed to increase by
5% p.a. through 1986, 2Z thereafter.
(b) Energy: based on 1983 actual average cost per km for the
various types of motive stock.
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tc) Maintenance: proportional to traffic growth.
(d) Overheads: at OZ of total direct working cost comprising
labor, energy and maintenance.
Source & Use of Funds
5. Government Capital Contributions to cease after 1986.
6. Borrowing at lO, with 15 year maturities.
7. Capital Expenditures from KNR's investment program through 1986, mission
estimates thereafter.
Balance Sheet
8. Deferred charges represents unrealized exchange losses and has been left
at its actual value as of December 31, 1983.
9. Net Fixed Assets have been revalued according to the inflation indices
set out at para. 1.
KOREA
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KOREA NATIONAL RAILROAD
Income Statements
(Years ended December 31)
Actual Este Forecast
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 i988 1Q89 1990
Traffic (million
traffic units) 32.4 31.8 33.3 35.1 37.1 38.5 40.5 41.8 43.2 44.6 1
Operating revenue 0
(billion won) 357 452 506 580 619 680 729 789 853 922
Operating cost 362 433 476 506 527 529 585 630 689 753
Net Operating
Revenue (5) 19 30 74 92 151 144 159 164 169
Net nonoperating
revenue 2 11 6 6 7 7 8 9 11 12
Interest charges 60 70 72 77 85 89 115 148 157 172
Net Income (63) (40) (36) 3 14 69 37 20 1R 9
Operating ratio 101 96 94 87 85 79 80 8o 81 82
Rate of return - overall -0.3 1,0 1,4 3.2 3.9 5,8 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.3
Rate of return
- commercial services 4.5 6,5 5.5 5.5 5.1 4.8
mM-
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KOREA NATIONAL RAILROAD
Source and Use of Funds
(Won billion)
Actual Est. Forecast
Years ended December 31 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Sources
Net operating revenues (5) 19 30 74 92 151 144 159 164 169
Depreciation and other
noncash expense 47 55 61 65 67 71 77 82 89 94
Nonoperating revenue 2 11 6 6 7 7 8 9 11 12
Sale of assets 11 12 21 - - - - - - -
Total Internal Funds 55 97 118 145 166 229 229 250 264 275
Borrowing 122 170 121 130 213 193 218 273 228 205
Government capital
contributiono 23 18 28 14 - 100 - - - -
Total Sources 200 285 267 289 379 522 447 523 492 480
Uses
Tcpital expenditures 138 156 144 155 186 274 253 306 300 300
Debt service 96 112 115 121 177 182 169 255 221 244
Change in net working
capital (excl. cash) (32) 11 3 13 (46) 1 38 (53) 43 (8)
Total Uses 202 279 262 289 317 457 460 508 564 536
Net cash filow (2) 6 5 - 62 65 (13) 15 (72) (56)
Opening cash balance 10 8 14 19 19 81 146 133 148 76
Closing cash balance 8 14 19 19 81 146 133 148 76 20
0
Debt service cover 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.1 1,2 1.1 a'
________________________________________________ 
_ . .
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XOREA AIONAL RAILROAD
Balance Sheets at December 31
(Won billion)
Actual Ent. Forecast
1981 1982 1983 TLW 1988S 1986 1987 1998 19R9 1990
Ctrrent Assets
Cash 8 14 19 1§ 81 146 133 148 76 20
Accounts receivable 14 17 20 22 25 28 28 29 30 31
Inventory 28 33 32 44 46 48 50 51 53 55
Other 4 7 7 8 9 10 10- 11 11 11
Total Current Assets 54 71 78 93 161 232 226 255 201 165
Fixed Assets
Net fixed assets ln use 1,748 2,064 2,246 2,349 2,524 2,841 3,141 3,543 3,84R 4,177
Construction w-I-p 113 133 156 207 211 222 255 250 350 450
Total Fixed Assets :,861 2.197 2,402 2.556 2.735 3.063 3.396 3.793 4,198 4,427
Deferred charges and
other assets 70 SS 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
TOTAL ASSErS 1,985 2.336 2,5$ 2,713 2,960 3.359 3,681 4,096 4,432 4,RO0
LIABILITIES
Current liabilities 135 135 134 137 189 193 ISS 214 174 195
Long-term debt 704 842 926 1,012 1,132 1,232 1,397 1,562 1.727 1,860
Equity
Covernment investment 197 215 226 241 241 341 341 341 341 341
Revaluation reserve 1,077 1,302 1,421 1,484 1,543 1,669 1,R25 1,998 2,193 2.405
Retained earnings (128) (158) (163) (160) (147) (78) (41) (21) (3) 6
Total Equity 1,146 1,359 1.484 1,565 1.637 1,932 2.125 2.31R 2.531 2.752
TOTAL LIABrLITIES 1.985 2.336 2.544 2.713 2.960 3,S 3.M8 4.096 4.632 4.808
Current ratio 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.0 0,9
Debt:Equity J8:62 38:62 38:62 39:61 41:59 39:61 40:6n 40:60 40:60 40:60
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